STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH versus JOGENDRA & ANR.

[2022] 2 S.C.R. 295

STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

JOGENDRA & ANR.

(Criminal Appeal No. 190 of 2012)

JANUARY 11, 2022

[N. V. RAMANA,CJI, A. S. BOPANNA ANDHIMA KOHLI, JJ.]

Penal Code, 1860: s.304-B, 498-A – Dowry death –Prosecution case was that fed up with the constant dowry demandsmade on her by the respondents (husband and father-in-law), whichher family could not satisfy, the victim-deceased committed suicideby immolating herself at her matrimonial home within seven yearsof her marriage – Conviction of respondents for offence underss.304B, 498A and 306 – On appeal, held: All the four pre-requisitesfor invoking s.304-B were satisfied, namely, that the death of thevictim-deceased took place at her matrimonial home within sevenyears of her marriage; that the said death took place in abnormalcircumstances on account of burning and that too when she wasfive months pregnant; that she had been subjected to cruelty andharassment by the respondents soon before her death and suchcruelty/harassment was in connection with demand for dowry –Taking into account the evidence brought on record by theprosecution, particularly, the testimony of P.W.-1 (uncle of thedeceased), analysis of the trial Court was correct and respondentsdeserved to be convicted under ss.304-B and 498-A – However, thefindings returned by the High Court that has acquitted therespondents for the offence of abetment to commit suicide unders.306 is not disturbed as the prosecution could not bring anyconclusive evidence on record to satisfactorily demonstrate that itwas due to the abetment on the part of the respondents that thedeceased had committed suicide by immolating herself.

Dowry prohibition Act, 1961: s.2 – Dowry – The term ‘dowry’takes within its ambit any kind of property or valuable security –Demand of money for construction of house – In the instantcase, the trial Court correctly interpreted the demand for money

Araised by the respondents on the deceased for construction of ahouse as falling within the definition of the word “dowry” – Thesubmission for the respondents that the deceased was also partyto such demand as she had on her own asked her mother andmaternal uncle to contribute to the construction of the house, mustbe understood in the correct perspective – It cannot be lost sightBof that the respondents had been constantly tormenting thedeceased and asking her to approach her family members formoney to build house and it was only on their persistence andinsistence that she was compelled to ask them to contribute someamount for constructing house – High Court fell in an error inCdrawing an inference that since the deceased had herself joinedher husband and father-in-law, and asked her mother or uncle tocontribute money to construct house, such demand cannot betreated as “dowry demand” – On the contrary, the evidencebrought on record was that the deceased was pressurized to makeDsuch request for money to her mother and uncle – It was not acase of complicity but case of sheer helplessness faced by thedeceased in such adverse circumstances – Penal Code, 1860 –ss.304-B, 498-A.Penal Code, 1860: ss.304-B, 498-A – Dowry death–EInterpretation of provision of law that will defeat the very intentionof the legislature must be shunned in favour of an interpretationthat will promote the object sought to be achieved through thelegislation meant to uproot social evil like dowry demand – In thiscontext the word “Dowry” ought to be ascribed an expansivemeaning so as to encompass any demand made on woman, whetherFin respect of property or valuable security of any nature – Whendealing with cases under s.304-B IPC, provision legislated to actas deterrent in the society and curb the heinous crime of dowrydemands, the shift in the approach of the courts ought to be fromstrict to liberal, from constricted to dilated – Any rigid meaningGwould tend to bring to naught, the real object of the provision –Therefore, push in the right direction is required to accomplishthe task of eradicating this evil which has become deeply entrenchedin our society – Interpretation of statutes – Dowry prohibition Act,1961 – s.2.

Partly allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. It is clear that during his extensive cross-examination, P.W.-1 firmly stuck to his statements that theharassment of his niece had started within six months of herwedding with the respondent No.1 who had asked her to fetch asum of 20,000/- from her mother and P.W.-1 for construction ofa house. The said demand was also made by the respondent No.1on P.W.-1 directly. P.W.-1 stated that the deceased had also informedhim that her father-in-law, respondent No.2 had raised demand of50,000/- on her for construction of house, which she was askedto convey to him. The said witness was consistent in his depositionthat he used to give money to his deceased niece and her husbandtowards expenses and that both of them had demanded sum of50,000/- for construction of house, which he had declined togive. P.W.-2 and P.W.-4, both maternal uncles of the deceased,had the same version to narrate as P.W.-1. [Para 8][305-G-H;306-A-B]

2. The most fundamental constituent for attracting theprovisions of Section 304-B IPC is that the death of the womanmust be dowry death. Four pre-requisites for convicting anaccused for the offence punishable under Section 304-B are asfollows: (i) that the death of woman must have been caused byburns or bodily injury or occurred otherwise than under normalcircumstance; (ii) that such death must have occurred within aperiod of seven years of her marriage; (iii) that the woman musthave been subjected to cruelty or harassment at the hands of herhusband, soon before her death; and (iv) that such cruelty orharassment must have been for or related to any demand fordowry. [Para 9][306-D-G]

3. Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act defines the word“dowry” and takes in its ambit any kind of property or valuablesecurity. The Latin maxim “Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat”i.e, liberal construction should be put up on written instruments,so as to uphold them, if possible, and carry into effect, the intentionof the parties, sums it up. Interpretation of provision of law thatwill defeat the very intention of the legislature must be shunnedin favour of an interpretation that will promote the object sought

Ato be achieved through the legislation meant to uproot socialevil like dowry demand. In this context the word “Dowry” oughtto be ascribed an expansive meaning so as to encompass anydemand made on woman, whether in respect of property or avaluable security of any nature. When dealing with cases underSection 304-B IPC, provision legislated to act as deterrent inBthe society and curb the heinous crime of dowry demands, theshift in the approach of the courts ought to be from strict to liberal,from constricted to dilated. Any rigid meaning would tend to bringto naught, the real object of the provision. Therefore, push inthe right direction is required to accomplish the task of eradicatingCthis evil which has become deeply entrenched in our society.[Paras 12, 13][308-D; 309-E-G]4. It cannot be lost sight of that the respondents had beenconstantly tormenting the deceased and asking her to approachher family members for money to build house and it was only onDtheir persistence and insistence that she was compelled to askthem to contribute some amount for constructing house. TheCourt must be sensitive to the social milieu from which the partieshail. The fact that the marriage of the deceased and the respondentNo.1 was conducted in community marriage organization wheresome couples would have tied the knot goes to show that theEparties were financially not so well off. This position is also borneout from the deposition of P.W.-1 who had stated that he used tobear the expenses of the couple. Before the marriage of thedeceased also, P.W.-1 had stated that he used to bear herexpenses and that of her mother and brother [his sister andFnephew] as her father had abandoned them. In this background,the High Court fell in an error in drawing an inference that sincethe deceased had herself joined her husband and father-in-law,respondents and asked her mother or uncle to contribute moneyto construct house, such demand cannot be treated as “dowry

demand”. On the contrary, the evidence brought on record showsGthat the deceased was pressurized to make such request formoney to her mother and uncle. It was not case of complicitybut case of sheer helplessness faced by the deceased in suchadverse circumstances. [Para 14][310-B-F]

5. The evidence brought on record amply demonstratesthat the harassment of the deceased for money had commencedwithin few months of her marriage and had continued thereafteron several occasions. On being persistently hounded with therepeated demands for money made on her which her family couldnot fulfil, the hapless deceased who was well into the secondtrimester of her pregnancy, immolated herself at her matrimonialhome. [Para 18] [314-C-D]

6. The above glaring circumstances when viewed together,can hardly mitigate the offence of the respondents or take thecase out of the purview of Section 304-B IPC, when all the fourpre-requisites for invoking the said provision stand satisfied.Though the High Court found the testimony of P.W.-1 [maternaluncle of the deceased] to be trustworthy and consistent and nocredible evidence could be produced by the respondents todemolish the prosecution version, surprisingly, their convictionunder Section 304-B IPC has been set aside and furthermore,respondent No. 2 has been acquitted for the offence punishableunder Section 498-A IPC. Taking into account the evidencebrought on record by the prosecution, particularly, the testimonyof P.W.-1, the analysis of the trial Court was correct and therespondents deserved to be convicted under Sections 304-B and498-A IPC. However, the findings returned by the High Courtthat has acquitted the respondents for the offence of abetment tocommit suicide under Section 306 IPC, is not disturbed as theprosecution could not bring any conclusive evidence on recordto satisfactorily demonstrate that it was due to the abetment onthe part of the respondents that the deceased had committedsuicide by immolating herself. Accordingly, the judgment ofconviction and sentence passed by the trial Court in respect ofboth the respondents under Section 304-B and Section 498-AIPC, is restored. However, the sentence imposed on them bythe trial Court of RI for life is reduced to RI for seven years,which is the minimum sentence prescribed for an offence underSection 304-B IPC. [Paras 19, 20][314-F-G, H; 315-A-D]

ABachni Devi and Another v. State of Haryana (2011) 4SCC 427 : [2011] 2 SCR 627; Kulwant Singh andOthers v. State of Punjab (2013) 4 SCC 177 : [2013] 5SCR 604; Surinder Singh v. State of Haryana (2014) 4SCC 129 : [2013] 14 SCR 825; Raminder Singh v. Stateof Punjab (2014) 12 SCC 582; Kans Raj v. State ofBPunjab and Other (2000) 5 SCC 207 : [2000] 3 SCR662; Dinesh v. State of Haryana (2014) 12 SCC 532 :[2014] 7 SCR 321; Sher Singh @ Partapa v. State ofHaryana (2015) 3 SCC 724 : [2015] 1 SCR 29;Gurmeet Singh v. State of Punjab (2021) 6 SCC 108;CSatbir Singh and Another v. State of Haryana (2021) 6SCC 1 – relied on.

K. Prema S. Rao and Another v. Yadla Srinivasa Raoand Others (2003) 1 SCC 217 : [2002] 3 Suppl. SCR339; Saro Rana and Others v. State of Jharkhand 2005DCrl.L.J. 65; Appasaheb and Another v. State ofMaharashtra (2007) 9 SCC 721 : [2007] 1 SCR 164;Vipin Jaiswal[a-1] v. State of Andhra Pradeshrepresented by Public Prosecutor (2013) 3 SCC 684 :[2013] 3 SCR 449 – referred to.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.190 of 2012.

From the Judgment and Order dated 10.09.2008 of the High Courtof Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur, Bench at Gwalior in Criminal Appeal No.48of 2004.

Bharat Singh, AAG, Prashant Singh, Sr. Adv., Pashupathi NathRazdan, Advs. for the Appellant.

Anish Kumar Gupta, Vaibhav Verma, Venugopal Abhay, Ms. RitaGupta, Advs. for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

HIMA KOHLI, J.

1. The present appeal has been preferred by the State of MadhyaPradesh, being aggrieved by the judgment dated 10[th] September, 2008passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, whereby the judgment ofconviction and sentence dated 17[th] December, 2003 imposed by thelearned Additional Sessions Judge on the original accused No.1, Jogendra– husband of the deceased, Geeta Bai[respondent No. 1 herein] and theoriginal accused No.2, Badri Prasad – father-in-law of the deceased[respondent No. 2 herein] has been set aside under Sections 304-B and306 of the Indian Penal Code,[1] while maintaining the order of convictionimposed on the original accused no. 1 – Jogendra under Section 498-AIPC and reducing the sentence from three years to the period alreadyundergone by him, but setting aside the conviction and sentence imposedon the accused No. 2, Badri Prasad even under Section 498-A IPC.

2. quick glance of the relevant facts is necessitated. Thedeceased was 18 years old when she got married to the respondent No.1 [A1] in social marriage organisation function[2] conducted on 7[th] May,1998. Before her marriage, Geeta Bai along with her mother, Kamla Baiand her brother used to reside with her maternal uncle, Bansi Lal [PW-1]. In less than four years of her marriage, Geeta Bai committed suicideat her matrimonial home by pouring kerosene oil and setting herself onfire. She was admitted in burnt condition in the Community HealthCentre, Baroda on 20[th] April, 2002 and breathed her last on the same

1 For short ‘IPC’

2 Samuhik VIvaah Sammelan

Aday. At that time, she was five months pregnant. On receiving informationfrom the attending doctor, an FIR was lodged on 23[rd] April, 2002 [ExhibitP-13]. On completion of the investigation, the charge-sheet was filedand the case was committed for trial in the Sessions Court.

3. After examining the evidence produced by the prosecution andBthe defence, the trial Court acquitted Sushila [A-3] – mother-in-law andJitender [A-4] – brother-in-law of the deceased, but convicted both therespondents [A-1 and A-2] [husband and father-in-law of the deceased]under Sections 304-B, 306 and 498-A IPC and imposed sentence ofrigorous imprisonment[3] for life for the first offence, RI for period ofseven years with fine for the second offence and RI for three yearsCwith fine for the third offence. The conviction and sentence imposed onthe respondents was primarily based on the evidence of Bansi Lal [P.W.-1], Shyam Bihari [P.W.-2] and Amrit Lal [P.W.-4], maternal uncles ofthe deceased who stated that the respondents had been demanding moneyfrom the deceased for constructing house which her family membersDwere unable to give. As result, she was constantly harassed andsubjected to cruelty, finally leading to her committing suicide. Dr. V.K.Garg [P.W.-8], who had conducted the post-mortem examination [Ex.P-7] on the dead body of the deceased, had deposed that on examiningthe uterus, there was foetus of five months in dead condition and, inhis opinion, the death of Geeta Bai had taken place due to burning.E

4. On the respondents preferring an appeal against the judgmentof conviction dated 17[th] December, 2003 passed by the Sessions Court,the High Court gave clean chit to the respondent No. 2 [A-2], whilesetting aside the order of conviction in respect of the respondent No.1[A-1] under Sections 304B and 306 IPC. However, the conviction ofFthe respondent No.1 was sustained under Section 498-A IPC, but thesentence of RI for three years imposed on him was reduced to theperiod already undergone by him. For arriving at such conclusion, theHigh Court was persuaded by the rulings in K. Prema S. Rao andAnother v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao and Others4,Saro Rana and OthersGv. State of Jharkhand5and Appasaheb and Another v. State ofMaharashtra6 and held that the demand of money for construction of

3 For short ‘RI’

4 (2003) 1 SCC 217

5 2005 Crl.L.J. 65 delivered by Division Bench of the High Court of Jharkhand

H6 (2007) 9 SCC 721

house cannot be treated as demand for dowry. The High Court agreedwith the submission made by the learned counsel for A-1 and A-2,respondents herein that the offence under Section 304-B was notestablished against them as the demand allegedly made on the deceasedwas for money to construct house, which cannot be treated as dowrydemand for connecting her death to the said cause. The respondentswere also acquitted for the offence under Section 306 IPC as the HighCourt was of the opinion that, from scrutiny of the depositions of P.W.-1, P.W.-2, P.W.-4 and P.W.-6, there was nothing to sustain the conclusionthat the respondents had abetted the deceased to commit suicide. As forthe offence under Section 498-A relating to cruelty meted out to thedeceased, the High Court acquitted the respondent No. 2, whilemaintaining the conviction order in respect of the respondent No. 1.Aggrieved by the said judgment, the present appeal has been filed by theState of Madhya Pradesh.5. Mr. Prashant Singh, learned Advocate General for the appellant-State has assailed the impugned judgment and contended that the HighCourt has failed to appreciate the harassment caused to the deceased atthe hands of the respondents who had been constantly demanding moneyfrom her to construct house and purchase plot of land; that the HighCourt did not consider the testimonies of Bansi Lal [P.W.-1], ShyamBihari [P.W.-2], Amrit Lal [P.W.-4] and Rajesh Bhai [P.W.-6], who hadunanimously stated that whenever the deceased used to visit her parentalhome, she would complain that she was being subjected to assault bythe respondents for bringing sum of 50,000/- [Rupees Fifty thousand]for constructing house and that it was due to this harassment causedby them that the deceased got fed up and was forced to commit suicide.Learned counsel argued that contribution of money to construct house,as demanded by the respondents from the deceased ought to be treatedas dowry demand and it is quite apparently case where the offenceunder Section 304-B was made out. It was also submitted that this wasa clear-cut case of abetment to commit suicide and both the respondentshad rightly been convicted for the said offence by the trial Court, whichorder has been erroneously overturned in appeal.

6. For the purpose of deciding the present appeal, it is consideredappropriate to extract below the statement of the uncle of the deceased,Bansi Lal [PW-1], who has been found to be reliable witness by boththe Courts below: -

“2. Whenever Gitabai had used to come then she had used to saythat she is beaten. She had told about beating by father-in-lawand husband. They had used to demand rupees fifty thousand forconstruction of house. So they had used to beat her. Since I hadno money so I did not give. I and people of society had alsoconvinced to son-in-law and father-in-law but they did not agree.Gitabai had also discussed about demand of rupees fifty thousandwith my sister and wife.

3. We had received the information of death of Gitabai by phoneat 11 o’clock of night. We did not give rupees fifty thousandthereafter Gitabai was beaten consequently her finger was alsofractured. Her husband has committed beating. Badriprasad hadalso expelled to Gitabai and Jogendra from the house. After ousterfrom the house, Gitabai and Jogendra had lived near the father ofBadriprasad in Khanpur. Then both of them had come to Kotafrom there. They had lived in Kota for 7-8 months. After spendingof money in Kota, both of them arrived near my sister Kamlabaiin Takarbada. Both of them had stayed in Takarbada for 1-2 days.Jogendra demanded rupees twenty thousand from my sister inTakarbada. My sister had told me about it. Rupees twenty thousandwas demanded for purchase of plot in Kota. The both Gitabaiand Jogendra arrived near me in Sultanpur from Takarbada.Jogendra also demanded rupees twenty thousand from me. Rupeeswas demanded for purchase of plot to construct the house. Moneywas used to demand as dowry. I had not given rupees. Then dueto not giving of money, threatening to my niece Gitabai, he hadcarried her to Kota.

4. I saw to Gitabai at that time. Then she was pregnant.Subsequently Badriprasad, Jitendra and Sushila went nearJogendra and Gitabai in Kota and keeping their luggage forcibly,they brought the luggage and they also brought to Gitabai andJogendra in their house. After three months of carrying from Kota,I received the news of death of Gitabai.”

7. Some of the relevant statements made by P.W.-1 during hiscross-examination are also extracted below:

“13. After about 6 months of it, Gitabai had again come to in-lawshouse and she had stayed for 6-7 months and when we had used togo to take her then in-laws of Gitabai had not used to send her.

Witness himself said that their harassment process had started duringthis time. My younger brother had gone to take her for 6-7 times inthis period. I had used to live in Kota. After this when my motherhad died then Gitabai had come and she had also come for onemore programme. When Gitabai had gone to in-laws house after 6months then after that I had met with her at the time of death of mymother. When my mother had died then Gitabai had come then shehad stayed with my brother for 6 months. When my mother haddied then Jogendra had come with Gitabai on third day and he hadalso caused beating before us. He had not got tea so Jogendra hadcaused beating. When Gitabai lived with brothers for 6 months thenI had gone there for many times during that period. Accused andSushilabai and Badri had also come there at the time of death of mymother. I had stayed in the village for 12 days. It is incorrect to saywhen Gitabai had stayed in Takarwada at the time of death ofmother then she had not made any complaint of in-laws there. Thisfact is correct that first of all Gitabai had complained at the time ofdeath of mother. Jogendra had stayed in our village for 2 days.

xxx xxx xxx

18. When Badriprasad had come at the time of death of mother.After that, I have not met with Badriprasad till today. Badriprasaddemands rupees fifty thousand for construction of house. Gitabaihad told me this fact when Gitabai had come after death of motherthen she had told this fact that Badriprasad demands rupees fiftythousand for construction of house. Sister Kamlabai had told methis fact. Besides her, any other person did not tell the fact ofdemand of rupees fifty thousand. After 7 – 8 months of death ofmother, Kamlabai had told me the fact of rupees fifty thousand.Which fact Kamlabai had told me, after 4 - 5 months of that,Gitabai and Jogendra had come near me for demand of rupeestwenty thousand.”

8. It is clear that during his extensive cross-examination, P.W.-1firmly stuck to his statements that the harassment of his niece, GeetaBai had started within six months of her wedding with the respondentNo.1 who had asked her to fetch sum of 20,000/-[Rupees Twentythousand] from her mother and P.W.-1 for construction of house. Thesaid demand was also made by the respondent No.1 on P.W.-1 directly.P.W.-1 stated that the deceased had also informed him that her father-

Ain-law, respondent No.2 had raised demand of 50,000/- [Rupees Fiftythousand] on her for construction of house, which she was asked toconvey to him. The said witness was consistent in his deposition that heused to give money to his deceased niece and her husband – respondentNo. 1 towards expenses and that both of them had demanded sum of50,000/-[Rupees Fifty thousand] for construction of house, which heBhad declined to give. Pertinently, Shyam Bihari [P.W.-2] and Amrit Lal[P.W.-4], both maternal uncles of the deceased, had the same version tonarrate as P.W.-1. Thus, the prosecution version was that the respondentsused to harass the deceased and that the respondent No. 1 had demandeda sum of 20,000/-[Rupees Twenty thousand], whereas the respondentCNo. 2 had demanded 50,000/-[Rupees Fifty thousand] from the deceasedfor constructing house and for buying plot of land. Fed up with theconstant dowry demands made on her by the respondents, which herfamily could not satisfy, Geeta Bai had committed suicide by immolatingherself at her matrimonial home within seven years of her marriage.D9. The most fundamental constituent for attracting the provisionsof Section 304-B IPC is that the death of the woman must be dowrydeath. The ingredients for making out an offence under Section 304-Bhave been reiterated in several rulings of this Court. Four pre-requisitesfor convicting an accused for the offence punishable under Section 304-B are as follows:E

(i)that the death of woman must have been caused by burnsor bodily injury or occurred otherwise than under normalcircumstance;

(ii)that such death must have occurred within period ofseven years of her marriage;F

(iii)that the woman must have been subjected to cruelty orharassment at the hands of her husband, soon before herdeath; and

(iv)that such cruelty or harassment must have been for orrelated to any demand for dowry.G10. As the word “dowry” has been defined in Section 2 of theDowry Prohibition Act, 1961[7], the said provision gains significance andis extracted below:

H7 For short ‘the Dowry Act’

“2. Definition of ‘dowry’ - In this Act, “dowry” means anyproperty or valuable security given or agreed to be given eitherdirectly or indirectly –

(a)by one party to marriage to the other party to the marriage;or

(b)by the parents of either party to marriage by any otherperson, to either party to the marriage or to any other person;

at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with themarriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahrin the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal law (Shariat)applies.

Explanation I.—xxxxxxxxx[8]

Explanation II.— The expression “valuable security” has thesame meaning as in section 30 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of1860).”

11. In three Judge Bench decision of this Court in Rajinder9Singh v. State of Punjab, Section 2 of the Dowry Act has been splitinto six distinct parts for better understanding of the said provision,which are as follows:

“8. perusal of Section 2 shows that this definition can be brokeninto six distinct parts:

(1)Dowry must first consist of any property or valuablesecurity— the word “any” is word of width andwould, therefore, include within it property andvaluable security of any kind whatsoever.

(2)Such property or security can be given or even agreed tobe given. The actual giving of such property or security is,therefore, not necessary.

(3)Such property or security can be given or agreed to begiven either directly or indirectly.

(4)Such giving or agreeing to give can again be not only byone party to marriage to the other but also by the parents

8 Omitted by Act 63 of 1984 (w.e.f. 2.10.1985)

9 (2015) 6 SCC 477

of either party or by any other person to either party to themarriage or to any other person. It will be noticed that thisclause again widens the reach of the Act insofar as thoseguilty of committing the offence of giving or receiving dowryis concerned.

B(5)Such giving or agreeing to give can be at any time. It canbe at, before, or at any time after the marriage. Thus, it canbe many years after marriage is solemnised.

(6)Such giving or receiving must be in connection with themarriage of the parties. Obviously, the expression “inCconnection with” would in the context of the social evilsought to be tackled by the Dowry Prohibition Act mean“in relation with” or “relating to”.”

12. In the light of the above provision that defines the word “dowry”and takes in its ambit any kind of property or valuable security, in ourDopinion, the High Court fell into an error by holding that the demand ofmoney for construction of house cannot be treated as dowry demand.InAppasaheb’s case [supra] referred to in the impugned judgment, thisCourt had held that demand for money from the parents of the deceasedwoman to purchase manure would not fall within the purview of “dowry”,thereby strictly interpreting the definition of dowry. This view has,E’however, not been subscribed to in Rajinder Singhs case [supra]wherein it has been held that the said decision as also the one in the caseof Vipin Jaiswal[a-1] v. State of Andhra Pradesh represented byPublic Prosecutor10, do not state the law correctly. Noting that theaforesaid decisions were distinct from four other decisions of this Court,11Fviz., Bachni Devi and Another v. State of Haryana,Kulwant Singh1213and Others v. State of Punjab,Surinder Singh v. State of Haryana,andRaminder Singh v. State of Punjab14, the Court opined that keepingin mind the fact that Section 304-B was inserted in the IPC to combatthe social evil of dowry demand that has reached alarming proportions,it cannot be argued that in case of an ambiguity in the language used inGthe provision, the same ought to be construed strictly as that would amount

10 (2013) 3 SCC 68411 (2011) 4 SCC 42712 (2013) 4 SCC 17713 (2014) 4 SCC 129H14 (2014) 12 SCC 582

to defeating the very object of the provision. In other words, the Courtleaned in favour of assigning an expansive meaning to the expression“dowry” and held thus :-

“20. Given that the statute with which we are dealing must begiven fair, pragmatic, and common sense interpretation so as tofulfil the object sought to be achieved by Parliament, we feel thatthe judgment in Appasaheb case [Appasaheb v. State ofMaharashtra, (2007) 9 SCC 721(2007) 9 SCC 721 : (2007) 3SCC (Cri) 468] followed by the judgment of Vipin Jaiswal [VipinJaiswal v. State of A.P., (2013) 3 SCC 684 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri)15] do not state the law correctly. We, therefore, declare thatany money or property or valuable security demanded byany of the persons mentioned in Section 2 of the DowryProhibition Act, at or before or at any time after the marriagewhich is reasonably connected to the death of marriedwoman, would necessarily be in connection with or inrelation to the marriage unless, the facts of given caseclearly and unequivocally point otherwise.”

[emphasis added]

13. The Latin maxim “Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat” i.e, aliberal construction should be put up on written instruments, so as touphold them, if possible, and carry into effect, the intention of the parties,sums it up. Interpretation of provision of law that will defeat the veryintention of the legislature must be shunned in favour of an interpretationthat will promote the object sought to be achieved through the legislationmeant to uproot social evil like dowry demand. In this context theword “Dowry” ought to be ascribed an expansive meaning so as toencompass any demand made on woman, whether in respect of aproperty or valuable security of any nature. When dealing with casesunder Section 304-B IPC, provision legislated to act as deterrent inthe society and curb the heinous crime of dowry demands, the shift inthe approach of the courts ought to be from strict to liberal, fromconstricted to dilated. Any rigid meaning would tend to bring to naught,the real object of the provision. Therefore, push in the right direction isrequired to accomplish the task of eradicating this evil which has becomedeeply entrenched in our society.

14. In the facts of the instant case, we are of the opinion that thetrial Court has correctly interpreted the demand for money raised by the

EFG

Arespondents on the deceased for construction of house as falling withinthe definition of the word “dowry”. The submission made by learnedcounsel for the respondents that the deceased was also party to sucha demand as she had on her own asked her mother and maternal uncleto contribute to the construction of the house, must be understood in thecorrect perspective. It cannot be lost sight of that the respondents hadBbeen constantly tormenting the deceased and asking her to approachher family members for money to build house and it was only on theirpersistence and insistence that she was compelled to ask them tocontribute some amount for constructing house. The Court must besensitive to the social milieu from which the parties hail. The fact thatCthe marriage of the deceased and the respondent No.1 was conductedin community marriage organization where some couples would havetied the knot goes to show that the parties were financially not so welloff. This position is also borne out from the deposition of P.W.-1 whohad stated that he used to bear the expenses of the couple. Before themarriage of the deceased also, P.W.-1 had stated that he used to bearDher expenses and that of her mother and brother [his sister and nephew]as her father had abandoned them. In this background, the High Courtfell in an error in drawing an inference that since the deceased hadherself joined her husband and father-in-law, respondents herein andasked her mother or uncle to contribute money to construct house,Esuch demand cannot be treated as “dowry demand”. On the contrary,the evidence brought on record shows that the deceased was pressurizedto make such request for money to her mother and uncle. It was not acase of complicity but case of sheer helplessness faced by the deceasedin such adverse circumstances.F15. Now, coming to the second point urged by learned counsel forthe State that the High Court has overlooked the fact that Geeta Bai hadbeen subjected to cruelty/harassment at the hands of the respondentssoon before her death, which submission is strictly contested by learnedcounsel for the respondents, we may note that the meaning of the

expression “soon before her death” has been discussed threadbare inGseveral judgments. In Surinder Singh (supra), while relying on theprovisions of Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872[15] andSection 304-B IPC, where the words “soon before her death” findmention, the following pertinent observations have been made: -

“17. Thus, the words “soon before” appear in Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, 1872 and also in Section 304-B IPC.For the presumptions contemplated under these sectionsto spring into action, it is necessary to show that the crueltyor harassment was caused soon before the death. Theinterpretation of the words “soon before” is, therefore,important. The question is how “soon before”? This wouldobviously depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.The cruelty or harassment differs from case to case. It relates tothe mindset of people which varies from person to person. Crueltycan be mental or it can be physical. Mental cruelty is also of differentshades. It can be verbal or emotional like insulting or ridiculing orhumiliating woman. It can be giving threats of injury to her or hernear and dear ones. It can be depriving her of economic resourcesor essential amenities of life. It can be putting restraints on hermovements. It can be not allowing her to talk to the outside world.The list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Physical cruelty could beactual beating or causing pain and harm to the person of woman.Every such instance of cruelty and related harassment has adifferent impact on the mind of woman. Some instances may beso grave as to have lasting impact on woman. Some instanceswhich degrade her dignity may remain etched in her memory for along time. Therefore, “soon before” is relative term. Inmatters of emotions we cannot have fixed formulae. Thetime-lag may differ from case to case. This must be kept inmind while examining each case of dowry death.

18. In this connection we may refer to the judgment of thisCourt in Kans Raj v. State of Punjab [(2000) 5 SCC 207 : 2000SCC (Cri) 935] where this Court considered the term “soonbefore”. The relevant observations are as under: (SCC pp. 222-23, para 15)

“15. … ‘Soon before’ is relative term which isrequired to be considered under specificcircumstances of each case and no straitjacket formulacan be laid down by fixing any time-limit. Thisexpression is pregnant with the idea of proximity test.The term ‘soon before’ is not synonymous with theterm ‘immediately before’ and is opposite of theexpression ‘soon after’ as used and understood in

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Section 114, Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act. Thesewords would imply that the interval should not be too longbetween the time of making the statement and the death. Itcontemplates the reasonable time which, as earlier noticed,has to be understood and determined under the peculiarcircumstances of each case. In relation to dowry deaths,the circumstances showing the existence of crueltyor harassment to the deceased are not restricted to aparticular instance but normally refer to course ofconduct. Such conduct may be spread over periodof time. If the cruelty or harassment or demand fordowry is shown to have persisted, it shall be deemedto be ‘soon before death’ if any other interveningcircumstance showing the non-existence of suchtreatment is not brought on record, before suchalleged treatment and the date of death. It does not,however, mean that such time can be stretched to any period.Proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty basedon dowry demand and the consequential death is requiredto be proved by the prosecution. The demand of dowry,cruelty or harassment based upon such demand and the dateof death should not be too remote in time which, under thecircumstances, be treated as having become stale enough.”

Thus, there must be nexus between the demand of dowry,cruelty or harassment, based upon such demand and thedate of death. The test of proximity will have to be applied.But, it is not rigid test. It depends on the facts andFcircumstances of each case and calls for pragmatic andsensitive approach of the court within the confines of law.

[emphasis added]

16. InRajinder Singh[supra], falling back on the rulings inKans1617Raj v. State of Punjab and Others,Dinesh v. State of HaryanaGand Sher Singh @ Partapa v. State of Haryana18, it has beenemphasized that “soon before” is not synonymous to “immediatelybefore” and the following observations have been made: -

16 (2000) 5 SCC 20717 (2014) 12 SCC 532H18 (2015) 3 SCC 724

“24. We endorse what has been said by these two decisions.Days or months are not what is to be seen. What must beborne in mind is that the word “soon” does not mean“immediate”. fair and pragmatic construction keeping in mindthe great social evil that has led to the enactment of Section 304-B would make it clear that the expression is relative expression.Time-lags may differ from case to case. All that is necessaryis that the demand for dowry should not be stale but shouldbe the continuing cause for the death of the married womanunder Section 304-B.”

[emphasis added]

17. In the above context, we may usefully refer to recent decisionof three Judge Bench of this Court in Gurmeet Singh v. State ofPunjab19that has restated the detailed guidelines that have been laiddown inSatbir Singh and Another v. State of Haryana20, both authoredby Chief Justice N.V. Ramana, relating to trial under Section 304-B IPCwhere the law on Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the EvidenceAct has been pithily summarized in the following words:

“38.1. Section 304-B IPC must be interpreted keeping in mindthe legislative intent to curb the social evil of bride burning anddowry demand.

38.2. The prosecution must at first establish the existenceof the necessary ingredients for constituting an offenceunder Section 304-B IPC. Once these ingredients aresatisfied, the rebuttable presumption of causality, providedunder Section 113-B of the Evidence Act operates againstthe accused.

38.3. The phrase “soon before” as appearing in Section 304-BIPC cannot be construed to mean “immediately before”. Theprosecution must establish existence of “proximate and live link”between the dowry death and cruelty or harassment for dowrydemand by the husband or his relatives.

38.4. Section 304-B IPC does not take pigeonhole approach incategorising death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. The reason

19 (2021) 6 SCC 108

20 (2021) 6 SCC 1

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Afor such non-categorisation is due to the fact that death occurring“otherwise than under normal circumstances” can, in cases,be homicidal or suicidal or accidental.”

[emphasis added]

18. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that the marriage betweenBthe deceased and the respondent No. 1 – accused had taken place on7[th] May, 1998 and the deceased was brought in severely burnt conditionfrom her matrimonial home to the Health Care Centre at Baroda on 20[th]April, 2002 and she had expired on the very same day. It is also not indispute that the death had occurred on account of the deceased dowsingCkerosene oil and setting herself on fire. The evidence brought on recordamply demonstrates that the harassment of the deceased for money hadcommenced within few months of her marriage and had continuedthereafter on several occasions. This fact is borne out from the depositionof PW-1, which shows that on not being able to fulfil the demand for50,000/- [Rupees Fifty thousand] made by the respondent No. 2 [father-Din-law], he had thrown out the deceased and the respondent No.1 fromthe matrimonial home. They had then shifted to Kota and resided there.Thereafter, respondent No.2 had brought the couple back to Baroda andhad again started demanding money from the deceased. Then thedeceased and the respondent No. 1 moved to Tankarwada. This time, itEwas respondent No. 1 who had demanded sum of 20,000/- [RupeesTwenty thousand] from the deceased and her uncle for constructing ahouse. On being persistently hounded with the repeated demands formoney made on her which her family could not fulfil, the hapless deceasedwho was well into the second trimester of her pregnancy, immolatedherself at her matrimonial home.F

19. The above glairing circumstances when viewed together, canhardly mitigate the offence of the respondents or take the case out ofthe purview of Section 304-B IPC, when all the four pre-requisites forinvoking the said provision stand satisfied, namely, that the death of GeetaBai took place at her matrimonial home within seven years of herGmarriage; that the said death took place in abnormal circumstances onaccount of burning and that too when she was five months pregnant;that she had been subjected to cruelty and harassment by the respondentssoon before her death and such cruelty/harassment was in connectionwith demand for dowry. Though the High Court found the testimony ofHP.W.-1 [maternal uncle of the deceased] to be trustworthy and consistent

and no credible evidence could be produced by the respondents todemolish the prosecution version, surprisingly, their conviction underSection 304-B IPC has been set aside and furthermore, respondent No.2 has been acquitted for the offence punishable under Section 498-AIPC.

20. Taking into account the evidence brought on record by theprosecution, particularly, the testimony of P.W.-1, this Court has nohesitation in holding that the analysis of the trial Court was correct andthe respondents deserved to be convicted under Sections 304-B and498-A IPC. However, we do not propose to disturb the findings returnedby the High Court that has acquitted the respondents for the offence ofabetment to commit suicide under Section 306 IPC, as the prosecutioncould not bring any conclusive evidence on record to satisfactorilydemonstrate that it was due to the abetment on the part of the respondentsthat the deceased had committed suicide by immolating herself.Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the trialCourt in respect of both the respondents under Section 304-B and Section498-A IPC, is restored. However, the sentence imposed on them by thetrial Court of RI for life is reduced to RI for seven years, which is theminimum sentence prescribed for an offence under Section 304-B IPC.