SATISH CHANDRA YADAV versus UNION OF INDIA & ORS

[2022] 10 S.C.R. 537

SATISH CHANDRA YADAV

UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

(Civil Appeal No. 6955 of 2022)

SEPTEMBER 26, 2022

[SURYA KANT AND J. B. PARDIWALA, JJ.]

Service Law – Appointment – Suppression of information/submitting false information in the verification form – Dismissal ofthe appellants from service – Correctness of – Held: In case ofappellant in Civil Appeal arising out of the SLP (C) No. 20860 of2019, what led to the termination of his services was not hisinvolvement in the criminal case which was then pending, and inwhich he was acquitted subsequently but the fact that he had withheldrelevant information while filling in the verification Form – Appellantwas given appointment on probation subject to the verification offacts given in the verification Form – Therefore, if an enquiryrevealed that the facts given were wrong, the respondent was atliberty to dispense with the services of the appellant – In theconnected Appeal arising out of the SLP (C) No. 5170 of 2021, theappellant had put in about four years of service before he came tobe terminated, however the said appeal also fails on the very sameline of reasoning – Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules,1965 – r.5 – CRPF Act, 1949 – Central Reserve Police Force Rules,1955 – r.27.

Service Law – Appointment – Public employment – CriminalAntecedents – Suppression of information or submitting falseinformation in the verification Form – Principles of law to be madeapplicable to such litigations – Held: Each case should be scrutinisedthoroughly by the public employer concerned, through its designatedofficials- more so, in the case of recruitment for the police force,who are under duty to maintain order, and tackle lawlessness,since their ability to inspire public confidence is bulwark tosociety’s security – Even in case where the employee has madedeclaration truthfully and correctly of concluded criminal case,the employer still has the right to consider the antecedents, andcannot be compelled to appoint the candidate – Further, acquittal

CDE

Ain criminal case would not automatically entitle candidate forappointment to the post – It would be still open to the employer toconsider the antecedents and examine whether the candidateconcerned is suitable and fit for appointment to the post –Generalisations about the youth, career prospects and age of thecandidates leading to condonation of the offenders conduct, shouldBnot enter the judicial verdict and should be avoided.

Service Law – Appointment – Suppression of information/submitting false information in the verification form – Criminalprosecution, arrest or pendency of criminal case – Precedent ofAvtar Singh case – Position of law post Avtar Singh – Discussed.C

Constitution of India – Article 136 – Scope of appeal under– Held: Unless, it is shown that exceptional and specialcircumstances exist; that substantial and grave injustice have beendone and the case and question present features of sufficient gravityto warrant review of the decision appealed against, Supreme CourtDwould not exercise its overriding powers u.Article 136(1) – Thewide discretionary power invested u/Article 136 is to be exercisedsparingly and in exceptional cases only.

Dismissing the appeals, the Court

EHELD: 1. The only reason to refer to and look into thevarious decisions rendered by this Court over period of time isthat the principles of law laid therein governing the subject arebit inconsistent. Even after, the larger Bench decision in the caseof Avtar Singh different courts have enunciated differentprinciples. In such circumstances, this Court has undertakenFsome exercise to shortlist the broad principles of law which shouldbe made applicable to the litigations of the present nature. Theprinciples are as follows:a) Each case should be scrutinised thoroughly by the publicemployer concerned, through its designated officials–more so,Gin the case of recruitment for the police force, who are under aduty to maintain order, and tackle lawlessness, since their abilityto inspire public confidence is bulwark to society’s security.[See Raj Kumar]

b) Even in case where the employee has made declarationHtruthfully and correctly of concluded criminal case, the employer

still has the right to consider the antecedents, and cannot becompelled to appoint the candidate. The acquittal in criminalcase would not automatically entitle candidate for appointmentto the post. It would be still open to the employer to consider theantecedents and examine whether the candidate concerned issuitable and fit for appointment to the post.

c) The suppression of material information and making afalse statement in the verification Form relating to arrest,prosecution, conviction etc., has clear bearing on the character,conduct and antecedents of the employee. If it is found that theemployee had suppressed or given false information in regard tothe matters having bearing on his fitness or suitability to thepost, he can be terminated from service.

d) The generalisations about the youth, career prospectsand age of the candidates leading to condonation of the offenders’0conduct, should not enter the judicial verdict and should beavoided.

e) The Court should inquire whether the Authorityconcerned whose action is being challenged acted mala fide.

f) Is there any element of bias in the decision of theAuthority?

g) Whether the procedure of inquiry adopted by theAuthority concerned was fair and reasonable? [Paras 68, 69][586-G-H; 587-A-G]

Avatar Singh v. Union of India, (2016) 8 SCC 471 :[2016] 7 SCR 445; Commissioner of Police v. RajKumar, (2021) 8 SCC 347 – referred to.

2. Article 136 of the Constitution empowers the SupremeCourt to grant special leave in its discretion against any judgment,decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matterpassed or made by any court or tribunal except by any court ortribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the armedforces. The jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 is divisible intotwo stages: the first stage is upto the disposal of prayer for thespecial leave to file an appeal and the second stage commences,

Aif and when, the leave to appeal is granted and the special leavepetition is converted into an appeal. Thus, the principles of lawdiscernible from the aforesaid are that unless, it is shown thatexceptional and special circumstances exist; that substantial andgrave injustice have been done and the case and question presentfeatures of sufficient gravity to warrant review of the decisionBappealed against, this Court would not exercise its overridingpowers under Article 136(1) of the Constitution. The widediscretionary power with which this Court is invested under Article136 is to be exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases only.[Paras 70, 71 & 75][587-G-H; 588-C-D; 592-E-F]

CPritam Singh v. State, AIR 1950 SC 169:[1950] SCR453; P.S.R. Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam and Another,(1980) 3 SCC 141 : [1980] 2 SCR 873 – followed.

Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359 :[2000] 1 Suppl. SCR 538; Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v.DMahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Ltd.,(2019) 4 SCC 376 : [2019] 3 SCR 411; Hem Raj, Sonof Devilal Mahajan of Bijainagar, Condemned Prisoner,at Present Confined in the Central Jail, Ajmer v. Stateof Ajmer, AIR 1954 SC 462 : [1954] SCR 1133 – reliedEon.

3.1 In so far as the Appeal arising out of the Special LeavePetition (C) No. 20860 of 2019 filed by ‘SCY’ is concerned, thesame should fail. This Court is not at all convinced with the caseput forward by ‘SCY’ for informing the respondent herein thatFthere was no criminal case pending against him on the date hefilled up the verification form. The explanation offered by ‘SCY’is nothing but his own understanding of what is prosecution andpendency of criminal case. If he knows that trial is deemed tohave commenced with the framing of charge, then he knows andunderstands what is criminal prosecution. Indisputably, ‘SCY’ wasGstill under probation at the time, his services had been terminated.It is also apparent from the record that ‘SCY’ had been givenappointment on probation subject to the verification of facts givenin the verification Form. Therefore, if an enquiry revealed that

the facts given were wrong, the respondent herein was at libertyto dispense with the services of the appellant ‘SCY’ as thequestion of any stigma and penal consequences at this stage wouldnot arise. It bears repetition that what has led to the terminationof the services of the appellant ‘SCY’ is not his involvement inthe criminal case which was then pending, and in which he hadbeen acquitted subsequently but the fact that he had withheldrelevant information while filling in the verification Form. He couldbe said to have exhibited or displayed such tendency whichshook the confidence of the respondent. Administrative law hastraditionally approached the review of decisions classified asdiscretionary separately from those seen as involving theinterpretation of rules of law. The rule has been that the decisionsclassified as discretionary may only be reviewed on limitedgrounds such as the bad faith of decision-makers, the exercise ofdiscretion for an improper purpose, and the use of irrelevantconsiderations. general doctrine of “unreasonableness” hasalso sometimes been applied to the discretionary decisions. Thesedoctrines incorporate two central ideas — those discretionarydecisions, like all other administrative decisions, must be madewithin the bounds of the jurisdiction conferred by the statutoryrules, but that considerable deference will be given to the decision-makers by the courts in reviewing the exercise of that discretionand determining the scope of the decision-makers’ jurisdiction.These doctrines recognise that it is the intention of legislature,when using statutory language that confers broad choices on theadministrative agencies, that courts should not lightly interferewith such decisions, and should give considerable respect to thedecision-makers when reviewing the manner in which discretionwas exercised. However, discretion must still be exercised in amanner that is within reasonable interpretation of the margin ofmanoeuvre contemplated by the legislature, in accordance withthe principles of the rule of law. [Paras 76-78][592-F-H; 593-A-G]

3.2 The learned ASG has rightly relied on Kendriya VidyalayaSangathan in which this Court held that the purpose of requiringan employee to furnish information regarding prosecution/conviction, etc. in the verification Form was to assess his characterand antecedents for the purpose of employment and continuation

Ain service; that suppression of material information and makinga false statement in reply to the queries relating to prosecutionand conviction had clear bearing on the character, conduct andantecedents of the employee; and that where it is found that theemployee had suppressed or given false information in regard tothe matters which had bearing on his fitness or suitability to theBpost, he could be terminated from service during the period ofprobation without holding any inquiry. This Court also made itclear that neither the gravity of the criminal offence nor theultimate acquittal therein was relevant when considering whethera probationer who suppresses material fact (of his being involvedCin criminal case, in the personal information furnished to theemployer), is fit to be continued as probationer. The observationsin the aforesaid case are fully applicable to the appeal filed by‘SCY’. It was deliberate attempt on the part of the appellant‘SCY’ to withhold the relevant information and it is this omissionwhich has led to the termination of his service during the probationDperiod. So far as the connected Appeal arising out of the SpecialLeave Petition (C) No. 5170 of 2021 filed by ‘PKY’ is concerned,the same also fails on the very same line of reasoning. The onlydifference in the case of the appellant ‘PKY’ is that he had put inabout four years of service before he came to be terminated.E[Paras 79-82][593-H; 594-A-F]

Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and Others v. Ram RatanYadav, (2003) 3 SCC 437 : [2003] 2 SCR 361 – reliedon.

Union of India and Others v. Methu Meda, (2022) 1FSCC 1; Union of India and Others v. M. Bhaskaran,AIR (1996) SC 686 : [1995] 4 Suppl. SCR 526; DelhiAdministration, v. Sushil Kumar, (1996) 11 SCC 605 :[1996] 7 Suppl. SCR 199; Kamal Nayan Mishra v. Stateof Madhya Pradesh and Others, (2010) 2 SCC 169 :G[2009] 16 SCR 237; R. Radhakrishnan v. DirectorGeneral of Police and Others, (2008) 1 SCC 660 :[2007] 11 SCR 456; Union of India and Others v. BipadBhanjan Gayen, (2008) 11 SCC 314 : [2008] 8 SCR99; State of Haryana and Others v. Dinesh Kumar (2008)(3) SCC 222 : [2008] 1 SCR 281; Daya Shankar Yadav

v. Union of India and Others, (2010) 14 SCC 103 :[2010] 13 SCR 1076; Commissioner of Police andOthers. v. Sandeep Kumar (2011) 4 SCC 644 : [2011]3 SCR 964; Jainendra Singh v. State of U.P. Tr. Prinl.Sec. Home and Others, (2012) 8 SCC 748 : [2012] 6SCR 1047; Avtar Singh v. Union of India and Others,(2016) 8 SCC 471 : [2016] 7 SCR 445; Commissionerof Police, New Delhi and Another v. Mehar Singh,(2013) 7 SCC 685 : [2013] 13 SCR 432; UnionTerritory, Chandigarh Administration and Others v.Pradeep Kumar and Another, (2018) 1 SCC 797 :[2018] 1 SCR 112; State of Madhya Pradesh and Othersv. Bunty, (2020) 17 SCC 654; State of Rajasthan andOthers v. Love Kush Meena, (2021) 8 SCC 774; Unionof India (UOI) v. Dilip Kumar Mallick, (2022) 6 Scale108; Pawan Kumar v. Union of India, (2022) SCCOnLine SC 532; Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut PrasaranNigam Limited and another v. Anil Kanwariya, (2021)10 SCC 136; Mohammed Imran v. State of Maharashtraand Others (2019) 17 SCC 696 – referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.6955Cof 2022.

From the Judgment and Order dated 15.04.2019 of the High Courtof Delhi at New Delhi in Writ Petition (C) No.1167 of 2018.

With

DCivil Appeal No.6956 of 2022.

Ms. Jyoti Dutt Sharma, Ms. Jaikriti S. Jadeja, C. K. Bhatt,Himanshu Gautam, M. M. Singh, Jitendra Kumar, Rameshwar PrasadGoyal, Advs. for the Appellants.

Ms. Madhavi Divan, ASG, Merusagar Samantray, Ms. B. SunitaERao, Ms. Nidhi Khanna, Raghav Sharma, A. K. Sharma, B. V. BalaramDas, Advs. for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

J. B. PARDIWALA, J. :

F1. Leave granted.

2. Since the issues raised in both the captioned matters are almostthe same and the principles of law applicable are also common, thosewere taken up for hearing analogously and are being disposed of by thiscommon judgment and order.

G3. We first take up the Appeal arising out of the Special LeavePetition (Civil) No. 20860 of 2019.

Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 20860 of 2019

4. This appeal is at the instance of an unsuccessful writ applicantof writ application being the Writ Petition (C) No. 1167 of 2018 filed inH

the High Court of Delhi and is directed against the judgment and orderdated 15.04.2019 by which Division Bench of the High Court rejectedthe writ application filed by the writ applicant (appellant herein) therebyaffirming the dismissal of the appellant herein from service as Constable(General Duty) with the CRPF.

5. The facts giving rise to this appeal may be summarised asunder:

5.1 The appellant herein was serving as Constable (GeneralDuty) with the CRPF. He was recruited as temporary employee ofthe post of Constable (GD) in the CRPF on 28.07.2014. After undergoingthe basic training, he reported at the 179[th]Battalion on 17.12.2015.

5.2 While filling up the requisite verification Form–25 at the timeof his recruitment in the CRPF in Column 12 in response to the questionwhether any case was pending against him, the appellant answered inthe negative.

5.3 Thereafter, under Rule 14 of the CRPF Rules, the Characterand Antecedents verification Form of the appellant was sent to theCollector, District Sant Kabir Nagar, Uttar Pradesh. The Collector, videhis letter dated 25.02.2015, informed the Deputy Inspector General ofPolice (DIGP), Group Centre, CRPF Rampur that the Criminal CaseNo. 1015 of 2008 had been registered against the appellant herein at theP.S. Khalilabad Sant Kabir Nagar, Police Station for the offencespunishable under Sections 147, 323, 324, 504 and 506 resply of the IndianPenal Code (for short, “IPC”). Upon receipt of the information asaforesaid, the services of the appellant herein came to be terminated inexercise of the powers conferred under Rule 5(1) of the Central CivilServices (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 vide the order dated 11.03.2016on the ground that he had concealed the information as aforesaid whilefilling up the Form–25.

5.4 The further appeal addressed by the appellant herein to theInspector General (IG) was also dismissed.

5.5 The appellant herein challenged his dismissal from service byfiling the Writ Petition (C) No. 10558 of 2016 in the High Court of Delhi.The said Writ Petition was disposed of by Division Bench of the HighCourt on 25.09.2017 remitting the matter to the Revisionary Authorityfor fresh consideration within period of six weeks from the date theappellant herein would make representation.

5.6 The representation filed by the appellant herein ultimately cameto be rejected and fresh order dated 05.01.2018 reiterating thetermination of the appellant’s services was passed.

5.7 The appellant herein once again preferred fresh Writ Petition(C) No. 1167 of 2018 challenging the impugned order dated 05.01.2018Bterminating his services.

5.8 The High Court rejected the writ petition vide order dated15.04.2019 holding as under:

“9. The fact remains that FIR No. 1015/2008 was registeredat P.S. Khalilabad against the Petitioner and placed underCSections 147/323/324/504/506 IPC. Admittedly, the Petitionergot bail in the above Criminal case which was for cognizableoffences. It is not therefore the case where the time of filingup of the verification form-25 the Petitioner was not awareof the pendency of the Criminal case against him.

11. In the present case, on the date of filling up of theverification form the criminal case against the Petitioner wasvery much pending. The fact that the charge sheet had beenfiled after the filling up the form will not make any differenceEto the fact that the Petitioner deliberately gave wrong answerto the question whether any case was pending against thePetitioner. This could not be termed as innocent. The Petitioneris applying for the post of Constable in para militaryorganization and is expected to be truthful in all responses toFthe columns in the verification form. At the time of filling upof that form the Petitioner was very much aware of thependency of the criminal case. Therefore, there could be noexcuse for not filling up the correct answer in response to thequestion under Column 12.

12. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds no reasonto interfere with the impugned order of the DA which wasconfirmed by the AA.”

6. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellant is herebefore this Court with the present appeal.

Submissions on behalf of the Appellant

7. Ms. Jyoti Dutt Sharma, the learned counsel appearing for theappellant vehemently submitted that the High Court committed seriouserror in passing the impugned order. She would submit that the prosecutionagainst the appellant was of very trivial nature. It did not involve anymoral turpitude. The suppression, if at all believed, by itself, cannot be aground to deny public employment. It was argued that the appellant hadno knowledge of the pendency of the criminal case on the date when theverification Form was filled up. She submitted that for the purpose ofdetermining whether the suppression was with guilty mind, theattestation/verification Form should be very specific and not vague so asto confuse the person filling up such Forms. It was further argued that atthe relevant point of time, the appellant was 19 years of age. The criminalprosecution against him along with the others was on account of familydispute. The appellant had been falsely arrayed as an accused in thesaid case. There was settlement between the parties before the localvillage panchayat. Ultimately, the appellant herein along with the otherco-accused came to be acquitted by the trial court.

8. The learned counsel placed strong reliance on the decision ofthis Court in the case of Avatar Singh v. Union of India, (2016) 8 SCC471 to fortify her submission that while passing the order of terminationof services for giving false information, the employer must take noticeof the special circumstances of the case, if any. The High Court, in thefirst round of litigation, had taken notice of such non-application of mindand thought fit to remit the case for fresh consideration. It was arguedthat even upon fresh consideration, the Authority committed the verysame mistake while reiterating the termination.9. In the last, the learned counsel submitted that the High Courtfailed to consider an important question of fact that the Form CRP– 25was quite vague and not specific about the information in regard to thecriminal antecedents. It is on account of such vagueness that the appellantwas not able to understand the question in proper manner and answeredthe same accordingly which is now being treated as false information.

10. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counselprays that there being merit in her appeal, the same may be allowed andthe impugned order passed by the High Court may be set aside and theappellant may be ordered to be reinstated in service with full back wages.

ASubmissions on behalf of the Respondent

11. On the other hand, this appeal has been vehemently opposedby Ms. Madhavi Divan, the Additional Solicitor General (ASG) submittingthat no error, not to speak of any error of law, could be said to have beencommitted by the High Court in passing the impugned order. She wouldBsubmit that the appellant is guilty of “suppression” of material facts which,by itself, was sufficient to terminate his services. It was argued that theservices of the appellant herein were terminated because he was foundguilty of submitting false information or to put in other words, guilty ofsuppression of material facts. The learned ASG vehemently submittedthat the appellant herein not only suppressed information about his arrestCbut also suppressed the information about the criminal case which waspending against him at the time he filled up the verification Form.

12. The learned ASG further submitted that the appellant hereinand the other co-accused were not honourably acquitted. They all cameto be acquitted as the prosecution witnesses turned hostile. The learnedDASG, while relying on the decision of this Court in the case of AvtarSingh (supra), more particularly, the para 38.4 therein submitted thatthe Authority concerned is duty bound to take into account the gravity ofthe offence in situation where acquittal is not recorded at the time offilling up of the verification Form.

E13. It was argued that in disciplined force which seeks to maintainhigh standards of integrity the suppression of material facts cannot becountenanced.

14. In the last, the learned ASG submitted that the judicial reviewunder Article 136 of the Constitution in matters pertaining to the suitabilityFof candidate is limited to the extent of determining if the Authorityconcerned had acted with malice, mindlessness or gross illegality. Sheplaced strong reliance on the decision of this Court in the case ofCommissioner of Police v. Raj Kumar, (2021) 8 SCC 347 to fortifyher submission that the scope of judicial review in the matters of theGpresent type is very limited. She placed reliance on the followingobservations made by this Court:

“28. Courts exercising judicial review cannot second guessthe suitability of candidate for any public office or post.Absent evidence of malice or mindlessness (to the materials),or illegality by the public employer, an intense scrutiny onH

why candidate is excluded as unsuitable renders the courts’decision suspect to the charge of trespass into executive powerof determining suitability of an individual for appointment.This was emphasised by this Court in M.V. Thimmaiah v. UPSC[M.V. Thimmaiah v. UPSC, (2008) 2 SCC 119 : (2008) 1 SCC(L&S) 409] which held as follows : (SCC pp. 131, 135-36,paras 21 & 30)

“21. Now, comes the question with regard to the selectionof the candidates. Normally, the recommendations of theSelection Committee cannot be challenged except on theground of mala fides or serious violation of the statutoryrules. The courts cannot sit as an appellate authority toexamine the recommendations of the Selection Committeelike the court of appeal. This discretion has been given tothe Selection Committee only and courts rarely sit as courtof appeal to examine the selection of the candidates nor isthe business of the court to examine each candidate andrecord its opinion. …

x x x x

31. Public service — like any other, presupposes that the Stateemployer has an element of latitude or choice on who shouldenter its service. Norms, based on principles, govern essentialaspects such as qualification, experience, age, number ofattempts permitted to candidate, etc. These, broadly constituteeligibility conditions required of each candidate or applicantaspiring to enter public service. Judicial review, under theConstitution, is permissible to ensure that those norms arefair and reasonable, and applied fairly, in non-discriminatory manner. However, suitability is entirelydifferent; the autonomy or choice of the public employer, isgreatest, as long as the process of decision-making is neitherillegal, unfair, or lacking in bona fides.”

15. The learned ASG also placed strong reliance on the decisionof this Court in the case of Union of India and Others v. Methu Meda,(2022) 1 SCC 1, more particularly, in the following observations as under:

“17. In view of the above, in the facts of the present case, asper paras 38.3, 38.4.3 and 38.5 of Avtar Singh case [Avtar

ASingh v. Union of India, (2016) 8 SCC 471 : (2016) 2 SCC(L&S) 425] , it is clear that the employer is having right toconsider the suitability of the candidate as per governmentorders/instructions/rules at the time of taking the decision forinduction of the candidate in employment. Acquittal ontechnical ground in respect of the offences of heinous/seriousBnature, which is not clean acquittal, the employer may havea right to consider all relevant facts available as to theantecedents, and may take appropriate decision as to thecontinuance of the employee. Even in case, truthful declarationregarding concluded trial has been made by the employee,Cstill the employer has the right to consider antecedents andcannot be compelled to appoint the candidate.”

16. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned ASGprayed that there being no merit in this appeal, the same may be dismissed.

AnalysisD

17. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the partiesand having gone through the materials on record, the only question thatfalls for our consideration is whether the High Court committed anyerror in passing the impugned order?

E18. The following facts are not in dispute:

a)The verification Form was filled up by the appellant on02.09.2014.

b)A First Information Report was registered against theappellant herein and others on 26.05.2008 for the offencesFpunishable under Sections 147, 148, 323, 324, 504 and 506resply of the IPC.

c)Upon registration of the FIR on 26.05.2008, the appellantherein filed two applications in the Court of the Chief JudicialMagistrate, Sant Kabir Nagar, one application seeking toGsurrender himself before the Court in connection with theFIR referred to above and the second application seekingfor regular bail.

d)It appears that the appellant upon surrendering before theChief Judicial Magistrate was taken in deemed judicialHcustody with effect from 06.06.2008 and was ordered to

be released on bail on 10.06.2008. It appears that theappellant was not actually put behind bars as asserted bythe appellant.

e)At the end of the investigation, the Investigating Officerfiled chargesheet in the Court of the Chief JudicialMagistrate which culminated in the Criminal Case No. 1015Bof 2008. The appellant herein and the other co-accusedwere put to trial and vide the judgment and order dated13.01.2016 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate DistrictSant Kabir Nagar came to be acquitted.

f)At the time when the services of the appellant came to beCterminated, he was probationer.

g)In the verification Form, more particularly in clause 12, thefollowing questions are to be found:

“(a)Have you ever been arrested?Yes/No �D(b)Have you ever been prosecuted?Yes/No �(c)Have you ever been kept under detentionYes/No �

x x x x

(i)Is any case pending against you in any Court Yes/No �

of Law at the time of filling up this Verification Roll?”

19. Against all the aforesaid questions, the appellant put tick on“NO”, as above.

20. The Authority concerned reached to the conclusion that theappellant had not only suppressed the fact that an FIR was registeredagainst him but also suppressed the fact that he had surrendered beforethe Chief Judicial Magistrate who, in turn, had released him on regularbail. He also suppressed the fact that there was Criminal Case No.1015 of 2008 registered against him and pending in the court of ChiefJudicial Magistrate for the offences enumerated above.

21. In such circumstances, notice was issued to the appellantherein to show cause as to why his services should not be terminated.Upon conclusion of the enquiry the appellant ultimately came to bedismissed from service.

A22. We now look into the connected Appeal arising out of theSpecial Leave Petition (Civil) No. 5170 of 2021.

Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 5170 of 2021.

23. This appeal is at the instance of an unsuccessful writ applicantof writ application being the Writ Petition (Civil) No. 9456 of 2018 filedBin the High Court of Delhi and is directed against the judgment and orderdated 04.02.2020 by which Division Bench of the High Court rejectedthe writ application filed by the writ applicant (appellant herein) therebyaffirming the dismissal of the appellant herein from service as Sub-Inspector/GD, 45th Battalion, CRPF.

C24. The facts giving rise to this appeal may be summarised asunder:

24.1 The appellant herein was serving on the post of SI/GD withthe CRPF.

D24.2 In August, 2011, the appellant had applied for the post of SIin the CRPF pursuant to call for applications by the Union PublicService Commission.

24.3 As part of the said application, the appellant was required tofill the CRP-25 verification Form. While filling up the form in August,2011, in response to the question of whether any criminal proceeding isEpending against him in any court of law, he answered in the negative.

24.4 The appellant came to be inducted in the CRPF as an SI.

24.5 The appellant received an order dated 19.11.2015 from theoffice of the Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIGP), Rampur, UPFwhereby he was informed that an inquiry would commence on the Articleof Charge (AOC) under Section 11 of the CRPF Act r/w Rule 27 of theCRPF Rules, 1955 that had been framed against him. The translatedversion of the statement of the AOC reads as under:

“That No. 115213628 SI/GD Pushpendra Kumar Yadav, C/G45 Battalion, CRPF, while working on the post of SubInspector / GD, being the member of force, has committed themisconduct and misbehaviour, in which at the time ofrecruitment, personnel gave false information in the PastAntecedents Verification Form (CRP Form – 25) at columnNo. 12 (a and b) that no case is pending against the personnel

in any court, however before the recruitment of personnel, acase Crime No. 261/2002 under Section 147, 149, 323, 325,504, 506, 307 IPC was registered against him at Police StationKhajni, District Gorakhpur (UP. Personnel, during hisrecruitment, has concealed the information regarding criminalcase pending against him and misguided the department bygiving wrong information, which is an offence punishableunder Section 11 (1) of CRPF Act, 1949 and Rule 27 of theCentral Reserve Police Force Rules, 1955.”

24.6 By an order dated 23.09.2016, the office of the DIGP imposeda penalty of removal from service on the applicant.

24.7 Departmental inquiry came to be conducted in which theappellant submitted his defence statement. The Inquiry Officer submittedhis report to the Commandant, 45[th ]Battalion, who in turn submitted it tothe DIG.

24.8 The appellant offered inter alia the following reasons in hisdefence:

(i) He was entirely unaware about the pendency of case againsthim in Rampur as he “was studying outside the village.”

(ii) When he met some of the co-accused, they “assured” himthat compromise had been reached in the criminal case.

(iii) He never received any summons nor appeared before anyCourt.

(iv) He could not understand the meaning of the contents of the12(a) and (b) of the verification Form.

24.9 Upon considering the aforesaid reasons put forth by theappellant and his response to the questions in column 12 (a) and (b) ofthe verification Form, the DIGP, Rampur vide order dated 23.09.2016imposed the penalty of removal of service on the appellant.

24.10 The appeal filed by the appellant in the office of the InspectorGeneral of Police (IGP), Lucknow also came to be dismissed.

24.11 The revision petition filed by the appellant in the office ofSDG also came to be rejected.

24.12 The appellant thereafter preferred the writ petition beingthe Writ Petition No. 9456 of 2018 in the High Court questioning thelegality and validity of the action of removal from service.

24.13 The High Court adjudicated the Writ Petition and vide theimpugned judgment and order dated 04.02.2020 rejected the same. TheHigh Court while rejecting the writ application held as under:

“26. The Court has perused all the impugned orders, whichhave taken note of the facts surrounding the Petitioner’s case,as noted in the foregoing paragraphs, and arrived at thedecision to remove the Petitioner from service. The Petitioner’scontention that the Respondents in accordance with thedecision in Avtar Singh (supra) were required to factor in therelevant facts as to his antecedents, is untenable. In order forthe Petitioner to demand that the Respondents consider hisantecedents before passing an order of termination fromservice, as per paragraph 34 (4) (c) of Avtar Singh (supra),the Petitioner’s acquittal should have been before hisappointment. Admittedly, the Petitioner’s case is not one ofacquittal before his appointment.

27. In any event, the order of the DA has set out detailedreasons for rejecting every contention raised by the Petitionerin his representation against the findings in the inquiry report.The orders of the AA, RA as well as the DG, CRPF also do notmerely reiterate the findings of each lower authority, but offerEtheir reasons for affirming the penalty of removal of service,while having regard to the CRPF Act and Rules. The Court,therefore, is not convinced by the Petitioner’s argumentalleging “non-application of mind” on the part of theRespondents.

F28. As regards the Petitioner’s submission that the Respondentshad not complied with the DoPT’s instructions on the handlingof anonymous/pseudonymous complaints as put forth inseveral OMs issued in this regard, it bears mentioning, firstly,that the OM dated 11th October, 2002 upon which thePetitioner relied, which stipulated that prior concurrence ofGthe CVC was required to taken to look into the verifiable factscontained in such anonymous/pseudonymous complaints, hassince been withdrawn by an OM dated 26th November, 2014.

29. Turning to OM dated 18th October 2013, paragraph 3(iii) thereof reads as under:

“(iii) If complaint contains verifiable allegations, theadministrative Ministry/Department may take cognizanceof such complaint with the approval of the competentauthority to be designated by the Ministry/Department asper their distribution of work. In such cases, the complaintwill be first sent to the complainant for owning/disowning,as the case may be. If no response is received from thecomplainant within 15 days of sending the complaint, areminder will be sent. After waiting for 15 days after sendingthe reminder, if still nothing is heard, the said complaintmay be filed as pseudonymous by the Ministry/Department.”

30. It must be noticed, at this juncture, that it is not thePetitioner’s case that the paragraph reproduced hereinabovewas not complied with by the Respondents. In any event, theaforesaid paragraph 3 (iii) makes provision for the methodof ascertaining the identity of the complainant before such acomplaint may be filed as “pseudonymous.” bare perusalof the record of the case evinces that such an attempt wasmade by the Respondents by engaging in correspondence withthe SP, Gorakhpur, through which the Petitioner’s involvementin criminal proceedings was incontrovertibly established.Indeed, nowhere has the Petitioner denied his involvement inthe case thereafter. Hence, the Respondents cannot be faultedfor relying solely on an unsubstantiated pseudonymouscomplaint in proceeding against the Petitioner.31. Learned counsel for the Petitioner then referred to letterdated 1st February 2012 issued by the Ministry of HomeAffairs announcing ‘Policy Guidelines for considering casesof candidates for appointment in the CAPFs - pendency ofcriminal cases against candidates- the effect of:.’ He referredin particular to para 2 (iii) of the said document which listsout instances where the candidate ‘will not be considered forrecruitment’ and to the first proviso thereto which states“Provided further that the candidate shall not be debarred inthe above cases, if only an FIR has been registered/the caseis under investigation and no charges have been framedeither or FIR or on the complaint in any court of law.” Learned

counsel for the Petitioner submitted that in the instant casesince at the time of his filling up the form in August 2011,only an FIR registered against him and charges were not yetframed, the above proviso would apply.

32. This Court is unable to accept the above submission. TheBsaid policy guidelines do not excuse the candidate from givingcorrect answers to the questions posed in the application/attestation form. In fact, it presupposes that the candidatehas been truthful about the pending FIR. However, in thepresent case, it is not in dispute that the Petitioner did notgive the correct answers to the critical questions aboutCpendency of the criminal case against him. The proviso topara 2 (iii) above, therefore, does not help the Petitioner.

33. For all the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds nomerit in the petition and dismisses it, as such.”

D25. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellant is herebefore this Court with the present appeal.

Submissions on behalf of the appellant:

26. Mr. M. M. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the writapplicant vehemently submitted that the High Court committed seriousEerror in passing the impugned order. He would submit that the criminalprosecution did not involve any moral turpitude. He laid much stress onthe fact that in the year 2002 when the criminal prosecution was institutedthe appellant was just 19 years of age and was not even residing in thevillage as he was pursuing his studies at some other place. He pointedFout that as it was family dispute, the same came to be resolved. Thesettlement was arrived at between the parties.

27. In the aforesaid context, the learned counsel invited the attentionof this Court to page 163 of the paper book. The document at page 163of the paper book is in the form of settlement recorded before the localvillage panchayat in writing duly signed by the parties concerned. TheGsame reads thus:

“SETTLEMENT BY THE PANCHAYAT

We, Ram Prit Yadav S/o Ishwari Yadav resident of village –Nakdah, police station-Khajani, District- Gorakhpur

….First partyA

And

We, Paramhansh Yadav S/o late Ram Bali Yadav R/o village-Nakdah, police station-Khajani, District- Gorakhpur

…..Second party

We both parties are resident of same village and are Pattidarwith each other. On the issue of land of khalihan near ourhouse and on ‘paimaish’ quarrel had occurred between uson 28.6.2002 and due to confusion and misunderstanding,me first party has submitted written complaint at police station.But now we both sides after sitting together is settling ourdispute through panchayat on 7.7.2002. Now onwards alldisputes have been mutually settled/over between us. I RamPrit Yadav first party do station Khajani, regarding thisPanchayati settlement tomorrow and will make written requestthat no further action is required to be taken regarding theincident occurred on 28.6.2002 because now we both sidesdo not want any further action in the matter in court. We bothsides have settled the issue mutually.

Second party

First partySd/-Ram Prit

Sd/-Paramhansh

Paramhash Yadav

Ram Prit Yadav

Witnesses:

1. Ramawati

2. Subhash Chandra Gupta

3. Anil Kumar Gupta

4. Chandra Bhan

5. Shyam Sunder

6. Ram Sagar

Date: 07.07.2002"

28. The learned counsel further submitted that the form was filledup by the appellant almost after period of nine years from the date of

Athe registration of the FIR in the year 2002. As it was family disputewhich ultimately came to be compromised, the appellant all throughoutremained under the impression that nothing further was required to bedone in regard to the criminal case. He further pointed out that the chargewas framed by the trial court in 2011 i.e. almost after nine years fromthe date of registration of the FIR. The trial ultimately resulted in acquittalBin view of the settlement arrived at between the parties.

29. The learned counsel would submit that the appellant bonafide believed that in view of the settlement arrived at between the parties,there was no criminal case thereafter pending against him and the others.

C30. The learned counsel submitted that even filling up of theverification Form, the previous record of the appellant was got verifiedthrough the District Magistrate who in turn sent report to the DIG,CRPF through the letter dated 28.11.2011 wherein it was stated thatnothing adverse was found in the police records. He submitted that on27.02.2015, one unknown person named Brijesh Yadav (who was laterDfound to be not traceable) made complaint with the respondent/department against the appellant regarding the pendency of the case.That the complaint was received by the Department, and report wascalled for by the office of the DIG, CRPF from the office of the SSP,Gorakhpur. In pursuance of this, the SSP Gorakhpur got an investigationEcarried out by the Circle Officer, Khajani, Gorakhpur and the CircleOfficer submitted his report to the SSP. In the report, it was mentionedthat no such person by name Brijesh Yadav was found and the CrimeCase No. 261/2002 was at the stage of settlement but since chargesheet was filed, it was pending in the Court. The report was sent by theSSP Gorakhpur to the DIG CRPF. He further pointed out that onF28.07.2015, the appellant was acquitted from all the charges by the Ld.Additional Sessions Judge, Gorakhpur in the Crime Case No. 261/2002on merits vide the judgment and order dated 28.07.2015.

31. The learned counsel further submitted that the appellant servedfor about 5 years in the CRPF with utmost sincerity and loyalty. Most ofGthe time during his (appellant herein) service, i.e. about 4 years, he servedin the region of Kashmir. His service record has been commendable andtime and again he was rewarded for his service. He further pointed outthat the appellant was also selected in the CISF as an ASI in 2010-11,but as he was already in service with the CRPF he could not join theCISF. He made fervent appeal that one chance may be given to theH

appellant as the termination from service will come in his way in allfuture employments public or private.

32. In such circumstances, referred to above, the learned counselprayed that there being merit in his appeal, the same may be allowedand the appellant may be ordered to be reinstated in service by set asidingthe impugned order passed by the High Court as well as by theDepartment.

Submissions on behalf of the Respondent:

33. On the other hand, this appeal has been vehemently opposedby Ms. Madhavi Divan, the learned ASG appearing for the respondent.She submitted that no error, not to speak of any error of law, could besaid to have been committed by the High Court in passing the impugnedorder. She reiterated the very same submissions as canvassed by herwhile opposing the connected appeal.

34. Ms. Divan, the learned ASG submitted that there being nomerit in the present appeal, the same may be dismissed.

35. The following facts are not in dispute:

a) The FIR was registered against the appellant herein and othersdated 28.06.2002 at the Khajani Police Station bearing Crime Case No.261/2002 for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 323, 325,307, 504 & 506 resply of the IPC;

b)The accused persons including the appellant herein werearrested & later ordered to be released on bail by the Sessions Court,Gorakhpur;

c) At the end of the investigation, chargesheet was filed in thecourt of the Judicial Magistrate, Gorakhpur. Upon filing of the chargesheet,the Criminal Case No. 3266 of 2009 came to be registered on the file ofthe court of the Judicial Magistrate, Gorakhpur;

d) The Judicial Magistrate Court No. 24, Gorakhpur vide orderdated 02.08.2011 committed the case to the Court of Sessions in exerciseof his powers under Section 207 of the CrPC;

e) The Sessions Court at Gorakhpur framed charge vide orderdated 23.12.2011 for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 323,325, 307, 504 and 506 resply r/w 149 of the IPC;

f) The trial court ultimately acquitted all the accused persons asthe prosecution witnesses turned hostile;

g) The material on record would indicate that at the time of fillingof verification Form on 20.08.2011, the appellant was on bail. On09.07.2002 chargesheet was filed and on 02.08.2011, copy of thechargesheet was also furnished to the appellant;

h) In the verification Form, more particularly in clause 12, theBfollowing questions are to be found:

of Law at the time of filling up this Verification

Roll?”D

36. Against all the aforesaid questions, the appellant put tick on“NO”, as above.

Position of Law

37. In Union of India and Others v. M. Bhaskaran, AIR (1996)ESC 686, this Court held that when an appointment is procured by aworkman on the basis of bogus and forged casual labourer servicecard, it would amount to misrepresentation and fraud on the employer.Therefore, it would create no equity in favour of the workman or anyestoppel against the employer and for such misconduct, termination wouldbe justified without any domestic inquiry. This Court held:F

“6. ... Consequently, it has to be held that the respondentswere guilty of misrepresentation and fraud perpetrated onthe appellant-employer while getting employed in railwayservice and had snatched such employment which would nothave been made available to them if they were not armed withGsuch bogus and forged labourer service cards. ...

… It was clearly case of fraud on the appellant- employer.If once such fraud is detected, the appointment ordersthemselves which were found to be tainted and vitiated byfraudand acts of cheating on the part of employees, were

liable to be recalled and were at least voidable at the optionof the employer concerned. …

… The aggrieved are all those who had similar or even betterqualifications than the appointee or appointees but who hadnot applied for the post because they did not possess thequalifications mentioned in the advertisement. It amounts toa fraud on public to appoint persons with inferiorqualifications in such circumstances unless it is clearly statedthat the qualifications are relaxable. No court should be aparty to the perpetuation of the fraudulent practice. It is ofcourse true as noted by the Tribunal that the facts of the casein the aforesaid decision were different from the facts of thepresentcase. And it is also true that in that case pending theservice which was continued pursuant to the order of theTribunal the candidate concerned acquired the requisitequalification and hence his appointment was not disturbedby this Court. But that is neither here nor there. As laid downin the aforesaid decision, if by committing fraud anyemployment is obtained, such fraudulent practice cannotbe permitted to be countenanced by court of law. …”

38. M. Bhaskaran (supra) was case of fraud as forgery wascommitted.

39. In Delhi Administration, v. Sushil Kumar, (1996) 11 SCC605, this Court laid stress on the fact that the verification of characterand antecedents is one of the important criteria to test whether the selectedcandidate is suitable to post under the State.

40. In Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and Others v. RamRatan Yadav, (2003) 3 SCC 437, this Court held that:

“12. … In the present case the respondent was to serve as aPhysical Education Teacher in Kendriya Vidyalaya. Thecharacter, conduct and antecedents of teacher will havesome impact on the minds of the students of impressionableage. The appellants having considered all the aspects passedthe order of dismissal of the respondent from service. TheTribunal after due consideration rightly recorded findingof fact in upholding the order of dismissal passed by theappellants. …”

ABC

A41. In the aforesaid case, this Court held that the purpose ofrequiring an employee to furnish information regarding prosecution/conviction, etc. in the verification Form was to assess his character andantecedents for the purpose of employment and continuation in service;that suppression of material information and making false statement inreply to queries relating to prosecution and conviction had clear bearingBon the character, conduct and antecedents of the employee; and thatwhere it is found that the employee had suppressed or given falseinformation in regard to matters which had bearing on his fitness orsuitability to the post, he could be terminated from service during theperiod of probation without holding any inquiry. This Court also made it

Cclear that neither the gravity of the criminal offence nor the ultimateacquittal therein was relevant when considering whether probationerwho suppresses material fact (of his being involved in criminal case,in the personal information furnished to the employer), is fit to be continuedas probationer.

42. In Kamal Nayan Mishra v. State of Madhya Pradesh andDOthers, (2010) 2 SCC 169, the ratio decidendi in Ram Ratan Yadav(supra) was discussed and clarified as follows:

“14. Therefore, the ratio decidendi of Ram Ratan Yadav (2003)3 SCC 437 is, where an employee (probationer) is required togive his personal data in an attestation form in connectionEwith his appointment (either at the time of or thereafter), if itis found that the employeehad suppressed or given falseinformation in regard to matters which had bearing onhisfitness or suitability to the post, he could be terminated fromservice during the period of probation without holding anyinquiry. The decision dealt with probationerand not holderFof civil post, and nowhere laid down proposition that aconfirmed employee holding civil post under the State, couldbe terminated from service for furnishing false informationin an attestation form, without giving an opportunity to meetthe charges against him.”[Emphasis supplied]

G43. Thus, this Court in Kamal Nayan Mishra (supra) held thatan employee who is found to have suppressed material facts at the timeof appointment, must be given an opportunity to defend the chargesagainst him and cannot be terminated without due notice.

44. In R. Radhakrishnan v. Director General of Police andHOthers, (2008) 1 SCC 660, this Court considered the case of candidate

for appointment as Fireman who had furnished wrong informationabout his involvement in criminal case, though he was acquitted. ThisCourt held that the standards expected of person intended to serve insuch service are different from the one of the persons who intended toserve in other services. It was also concluded that the candidate knewand understood the implications of the omission in his statement to disclosevital information. The candidate by not disclosing his involvement in acriminal case, prevented the Authority from verifying his character as asuitable appointment. This Court, therefore, declined to exercise itsequitable jurisdiction in favour of such candidate who had suppressedsuch material facts.

45. Similarly, in the Union of India and Others v. Bipad BhanjanGayen, (2008) 11 SCC 314, this Court dealt with the validity of thetermination of the candidate, who had been selected for training as aconstable in the Railway Protection Force. This Court recognised thatdifferent standards are to apply to the different services while determiningthe question of validity of the termination when material facts aresuppressed. It was held as under:

“10. It bears repetition that what has led to the termination ofservice of the respondent is not his involvement in the twocases which were then pending, and in which he had beendischarged subsequently, but the fact that he had withheldrelevant information while filling in the attestation form. Weare further of the opinion that an employment as police-officer presupposes higher level of integrity as such aperson is expected to uphold the law, and on the contrary,such service born in deceit and subterfuge cannot betolerated.”

[Emphasis supplied]

46. In State of Haryana and Others v. Dinesh Kumar (2008)(3) SCC 222, this Court considered the case of an employee (constabledriver for State Police) who had answered “No” to query as to whetherhe was arrested. The employee had argued that as layman, hisunderstanding of arrest did not match with the legal definition of arrest.The candidate said he had voluntarilyappeared before the Magistrate,without being taken into formal custody, was granted bail and wasultimately acquitted. This Court held as under:

“12. One of the common questions which, therefore, need tobe answered in both these appeals is whether the manner inwhich they had appeared before the Magistrate and had beenreleased without being taken into formal custody, couldamount to “arrest” for the purpose of the query in Column13(A). …

x x x x

31. In our view, the reasoning given in Dinesh Kumar’s casein that context is possibleview and does not call forinterference under Article 136 of the Constitution. Conversely,Cthe decision rendered in the writ petitions filed by Lalit Kumarand Bhupinder has to be reversed to be in line with the decisionin Dinesh Kumar’s case. When the question as to whatconstitutes “arrest” has for long engaged the attention ofdifferent High Courts as also this Court, it may not bealtogether unreasonable toexpect layman to construe thatDhe had never been arrested on his appearing before the courtand being granted bail immediately. The positionwould havebeen different, had the person concerned not been releasedon bail. We would, in the facts of these cases, give the benefitof mistaken impression, rather thanthat of deliberate andEwilful misrepresentation and concealment of facts, to theappellants in the second of the two appeals as well, whileaffirming the view taken by the High Court in Dinesh Kumar’scase.”

[Emphasis supplied]

F47. Thus, it was held that even if what transpired may technicallyamount to arrest, the benefit of mistaken impression rather than theconsequences of deliberate and willful misrepresentation andconcealment of facts, should be extended to the employee.

48. This Court in the case of Daya Shankar Yadav v. Union ofGIndia and Others, (2010) 14 SCC 103 was faced with similar issuewherein CRPF officer upon suppression of material facts wasterminated from the service. This Court while referring to its previousdecisions, summarised the position as follows:

“14. … The purpose of seeking the said information is toHascertain the character and antecedents of the candidate so

as to assess his suitability for the post. Therefore, thecandidate will have to answer the questions in these columnstruthfully and fully and any misrepresentation or suppressionor false statement therein, by itself would demonstrate aconduct orcharacter unbefitting for uniformed securityservice.”

15. When an employee or prospective employee declares ina verification form, answers to the queries relating tocharacter and antecedents, the verification thereof cantherefore lead to any of the following consequences:

(a) If the declarant has answered the questions in theaffirmative and furnished the details of any criminal case(wherein he was convicted or acquitted by giving benefitof doubt for want of evidence), the employer may refuse tooffer him employment (or if already employed on probation,discharge him from service), if he is found to be unfit havingregard to the nature and gravity of the offence/crime inwhich he was involved.

(b) On the other hand, if the employer finds that the criminalcase disclosed by the declarant related to offences whichwere technical, or of nature that would not affect thedeclarant’s fitness for employment, or where the declaranthad been honourably acquitted and exonerated, theemployer may ignore the fact that the declarant had beenprosecuted in criminal case and proceed to appoint himor continue him in employment.

(c) Where the declarant has answered the questions in thenegative and on verification it is found that the answerswere false, the employer may refuse to employ the declarant(or discharge him, if already employed), even if thedeclarant had been cleared of the charges or is acquitted.This is because when there is suppression or non-disclosure of material information bearing on his character,that itself becomes reason for not employing thedeclarant.

(d) Where the attestation form or verification form doesnot contain proper or adequate queries requiring the

declarant to disclose his involvement in any criminalproceedings, or where the candidate was unaware ofinitiation of criminal proceedings when he gave thedeclarations in the verification roll/attestation form, thenthe candidate cannot be found fault with, for not furnishingthe relevant information. But if the employer by other means(say police verification or complaints etc.) learns aboutthe involvement of the declarant, the employer can haverecourse to courses (a) or (b) above.

16. Thus an employee on probation can be discharged fromservice or prospectiveemployee may be refused employment:

(i) on the ground of unsatisfactory antecedents andcharacter, disclosed from his conviction in criminal case,or his involvement in criminal offence (even if he wasacquitted on technical grounds or by giving benefit ofdoubt) or other conduct (like copying in examination) orDrustication or suspension or debarment from college etc.;and

(ii) on the ground of suppression of material informationor making false statement in reply to queries relating toprosecution or conviction for criminal offence (even if

Ehe was ultimately acquitted in the criminal case).

This ground is distinct from the ground of previous antecedentsand character, as it shows current dubious conduct andabsence of character at the time of making the declaration, therebymaking him unsuitable for the post.”F

49. This Court in the aforesaid case while deliberating on the verysame questions as were asked in the verification Form from the appellantin the present case, held that:

“24. We are satisfied that the appellant had knowingly madea false statement that he was not prosecuted in any criminalGcase. Therefore, the employer (CRPF) was justified indispensing with his services for not being truthful in givingmaterial information regarding his antecedents which wererelevant for employment in uniformed service, and that itselfjustified his discharge from service. Consequently, we dismissHthis appeal as having no merit.”

50. In the case of Commissioner of Police and Others. v.Sandeep Kumar (2011) 4 SCC 644, the candidate after clearing thetest, disclosed his involvement in criminal case which was compromisedand later on such compromise was acquitted. Show-Cause noticewas issued to him asking him to show cause as to why his candidaturefor the post should not be cancelled as he had concealed the fact of hisinvolvement in the criminal case and had made wrong statement in hisapplication form. The authorities were not satisfied with the explanationoffered and went on to terminate his employment. challenge was madeby him before the Administrative Tribunal which declined to interfere.However, the High Court granted the relief by setting aside the proposalfor cancellation of his candidature. This Court upheld the order of theHigh Court by granting the relief and held as under:

“12. It is true that in the application form the respondent didnot mention that he was involved in criminal case underSections 325/34 IPC. Probably he did not mention this out offear that if he did so he would automatically be disqualified.At any event, it was not such serious offence like murder,dacoity or rape, and hence more lenient view should betaken in the matter.”

51. The Court in the aforesaid took into consideration the factthat the incident had happened when the respondent was 20 years ofage. The Court held that young people are not expected to behave in asmature manner as the older people. The Court highlighted that theapproach should be to condone minor indiscretions made by young peoplerather than to brand them as criminals for the rest of their lives.

52. In the case of Jainendra Singh v. State of U.P. Tr. Prinl.Sec. Home and Others, (2012) 8 SCC 748, this Court, while referringto its previous precedents set on the issue of suppression of materialfacts being ground for termination laid down certain principles to beconsidered. This Court also called for the constitution of larger Benchto settle the issue.The yardsticks laid down by this Court are as below:

“29. As noted by us, all the above decisions were rendered bya Division Bench of this Court consisting of two-Judges andhaving bestowed our serious consideration to the issue, weconsider that while dealing with such an issue, the Court willhave to bear in mind the various cardinal principles beforegranting any relief to the aggrieved party, namely:

A29.1 Fraudulently obtained orders of appointment could belegitimately treated as voidable at the option of the employeror could be recalled by the employer and in such cases merelybecause the respondent employee has continued in servicefor number of years, on the basis of such fraudulentlyobtained employment, cannot get any equity in his favour orBany estoppel against the employer.

29.2 Verification of the character and antecedents is one ofthe important criteriato test whether the selected candidate issuitable to the post under the State andon account of hisantecedents the appointing authority if find it not desirableto appoint person to disciplined force can it be said to beunwarranted.

29.3 When appointment was procured by person on the basisof forged documents, it would amount to misrepresentationand fraud on the employer and, therefore, it would create noequity in his favour or any estoppel against the employerwhile resorting to termination without holding any inquiry.

29.4 candidate having suppressed material information and/or giving false information cannot claim right to continue inservice and the employer, having regard to the nature ofemployment as well as other aspects, has the discretion toterminate his services.

29.5 The purpose of calling for information regardinginvolvement in any criminal case or detention or convictionis for the purpose of verification of the character/antecedentsat the time of recruitment and suppression of such materialFinformation will have clear bearing on the character andantecedents of the candidate in relation to his continuity inservice.

29.6 The person who suppressed the material information and/or gives false information cannot claim any right forGappointment or continuity in service.

29.7 The standard expected of person intended to serve inuniformed service is quite distinct from other services and,therefore, any deliberate statement or omission regarding avital information can be seriously viewed and the ultimatedecision of the appointing authority cannot be faulted.

29.8 An employee on probation can be discharged from serviceor may be refused employment on the ground of suppressionof material information or making false statement relating tohis involvement in the criminal case, conviction or detention,even if ultimately he was acquitted of the said case, inasmuchas such situation would make person undesirable orunsuitable for the post.

29.9 An employee in the uniformed service presupposes ahigher level of integrity as such person is expected to upholdthe law and on the contrary such service born in deceit andsubterfuge cannot be tolerated.

29.10 The authorities entrusted with the responsibility ofappointing constables, are under duty to verify theantecedents of candidate to find out whether he is suitablefor the post of constable and so long as the candidate hasnot been acquitted in the criminal case, he cannot be held tobe suitable for appointment to the post of constable.”

53. The Court while referring the issues to larger Bench observedin paras 30 and 31 resply as under:

“30. When we consider the above principles laid down in themajority of the decisions, the question that looms large beforeus is when considering such claim by the candidates whodeliberately suppressed information at the time of recruitment,can there be different yardsticks applied in the matter of grantof relief.

31. Though there are very many decisions in support of thevarious points culled out in the above paragraphs, inasmuchas we have noted certain other decisions taking different viewof coordinate Benches, we feel it appropriate to refer theabovementioned issues to larger Bench of this Court for anauthoritative pronouncement so that there will be no conflictof views and which will enable the courts to apply the lawuniformly while dealing with such issues.”

54. This Court before settling the issues in the case of Avtar Singhv. Union of India and Others, (2016) 8 SCC 471, discussed the saidprinciples extensively in the matter of Commissioner of Police, NewDelhi and Another v. Mehar Singh, (2013) 7 SCC 685. In this case, acandidate for the post of constable in the Delhi Police had disclosed his

Ainvolvement in criminal case, wherein he was acquitted on technicalgrounds. The candidate had his candidature for the post rejected by theStanding Committee. The candidate argued that as he had been acquitted,the Standing Committee by rejecting his candidature had overreachedthe decision of the competent Authority. This Court, whiledeciding onthe issue and whether the respondent was honourably acquitted, held asBunder:

“25. The expression “honourable acquittal” was consideredby this Court in S. Samuthiram 2013 (1) SCC 598. In thatcase this Court was concerned with situation wheredisciplinary proceedings were initiated against policeCofficer. Criminal case was pending against him under Section509 IPC and under Section 4 of the Eve-Teasing Act. He wasacquitted in that case because of the non-examination of keywitnesses. There was serious flaw in the conduct of thecriminal case. Two material witnesses turned hostile. ReferringDto the judgment of this Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal(1994) 1 SCC 541 where in somewhat similar fact situation,this Court upheld bank’s action of refusing to reinstate anemployee in service on the ground that in the criminal casehe was acquitted by giving him benefit of doubt and, therefore,it was not an honourable acquittal, this Court held that theEHigh Court wasnot justified in setting aside the punishmentimposed in the departmental proceedings. This Court observedthat the expressions “honourable acquittal”, “acquitted ofblame” and “fully exonerated” are unknown to the CriminalProcedure Code or the Penal Code. They are coined byFjudicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define what is meantby the expression “honourably acquitted”. This Courtexpressed that when the accused is acquitted after fullconsideration of the prosecution case and theprosecutionmiserably fails to prove the charges levelledagainst the accused, it can possibly be said that the accusedGwas honourably acquitted.

26. In light of the above, we are of the opinion that since thepurpose of the departmental proceedings is to keep persons,who are guilty of serious misconduct or dereliction of duty orwho are guilty of grave cases of moral turpitude, out of the

department, if found necessary, because they pollute thedepartment, surely the above principles will apply with morevigour at the point of entry of person in the police departmenti.e.at the time of recruitment. If it is found by the ScreeningCommittee thatthe person against whom serious caseinvolving moral turpitude is registered is discharged ontechnical grounds or is acquitted of the same charge but theacquittal isnot honourable, the Screening Committee wouldbe entitled to cancel his candidature. Stricter norms need tobe applied while appointing persons in disciplinary forcebecause public interest is involved in it.

x x x x

34. The respondents are trying to draw mileage from the factthat in their application and/or attestation form they havedisclosed their involvement in criminal case. We donot seehow this fact improves their case. Disclosure of these facts inthe application/attestation form is an essential requirement.An aspirant is expected to state these facts honestly. Honestyand integrity are inbuilt requirements of the police force.Therespondents should not, therefore, expect to score any browniepoints because of this disclosure. Besides, this has norelevance to the point in issue. It bears repetition to state thatwhile deciding whether person against whom criminalcase was registered and who was later on acquitted ordischarged should be appointed to post inthe police force,what is relevant is the nature of the offence, the extent ofhisinvolvement, whether the acquittal was clean acquittalor an acquittal by giving benefit of doubt because thewitnesses turned hostile or because of some serious flaw inthe prosecution, and the propensity of such person to indulgein similar activities infuture.This decision, in our opinion,can only be taken by the Screening Committee created forthat purpose by the Delhi Police. If the Screening Committee’sdecision is not mala fide or actuated by extraneousconsiderations, then, it cannot be questioned.

35. The police force is disciplined force. It shoulders thegreat responsibility of maintaining law and order and publicorder in the society. People repose great faith and confidence

Ain it. It must be worthy of that confidence. candidate wishingto join the police force must be person of utmost rectitude.He must have impeccable character and integrity. personhaving criminal antecedents will not fit in this category. Evenif he is acquitted or discharged in the criminal case, thatacquittal or discharge order will have to be examined to seeBwhether he has been completely exonerated in the casebecause even possibility of his taking to the life of crimesposes threat to the discipline of the police force. TheStanding Order, therefore, has entrusted the task of takingdecisions in these matters to the Screening Committee. TheCdecision of the Screening Committee must be taken as finalunless it is mala fide. In recent times, the image of the policeforce is tarnished. Instances of police personnel behaving ina wayward manner by misusing power are in public domainand are matter of concern. The reputation of the policeforce has taken beating. In such situation, we would notDlike to dilute the importance and efficacy of mechanismlike the Screening Committee created by the Delhi Police toensure that persons who are likely to erode its credibility donot enter the police force. At the same time, the ScreeningCommittee must be alive to the importance of trust reposed inEit and must treat all candidates with even hand.”

[Emphasis supplied]

Precedent of Avtar Singh

55. In the case of Avtar Singh (supra), three-Judge Bench ofFthis Court looked into the conflict of opinion in the various decisionshighlighted in Jainendra Singh (supra). The larger Bench consideredplethora of decisions on the question of suppression of information orsubmitting false information in the verification Form, also as to the questionof having been criminally prosecuted, arrested or as to the pendency ofa criminal case. After analysing all the previous decisions of this CourtGon the subject, the larger Bench held as follows:

“30. The employer is given ‘discretion’ to terminate orotherwise to condone the omission. Even otherwise, onceemployer has the power to take decision when at the time offilling verification form declarant has already been convicted/Hacquitted, in such case, it becomes obvious that all the facts

and attending circumstances, including impact of suppressionor false information are taken into consideration whileadjudging suitability of an incumbent for services in question.In case the employer comes to the conclusion that suppressionis immaterial and even if facts would have been disclosed itwould not have adversely affected fitness of an incumbent,for reasons to be recorded, it has power to condone the lapse.However, while doing so employer has to act prudently ondue consideration of nature of post and duties to be rendered.For higher officials/higher posts, standard has to be veryhigh and even slightest false information or suppression mayby itself render person unsuitable for the post. However,same standard cannot be applied to each and every post. Inconcluded criminal cases, it has to be seen what has beensuppressed is material fact and would have rendered anincumbent unfit for appointment. An employer would bejustified in not appointing or if appointed, to terminateservices of such incumbent on due consideration of variousaspects. Even if disclosure has been made truthfully, theemployer has the right to consider fitness and while doing soeffect of conviction and background facts of case, nature ofoffence, etc. have to be considered. Even if acquittal has beenmade, employer may consider nature of offence, whetheracquittal is honourable or giving benefit of doubt on technicalreasons and decline to appoint person who is unfit or ofdubious character. In case employer comes to conclusion thatconviction or ground of acquittal in criminal case would notaffect the fitness for employment incumbent may be appointedor continued in service.”

56. The larger Bench stated that an objective criterion must beapplied while terminating an employee who had suppressed materialfacts. The Court held that mere suppression cannot be the sole reasonfor termination and due consideration must be paid to the facts of thecase. The Court, while discussing the objective yardsticks that are to beapplied held as under:

“34. No doubt about it that verification of character andantecedents is one of the important criteria to assess suitabilityand it is open to employer to adjudge antecedents of the

DEF

incumbent, but ultimate action should be based upon objectivecriteria on due consideration of all relevant aspects.

35. Suppression of “material” information presupposes thatwhat is suppressed that “matters” not every technical or trivialmatter. The employer has to act on due consideration of rules/Binstructions if any in exercise of powers in order to cancelcandidature or for terminating the services of employee.Though person who has suppressed the material informationcannot claim unfettered right for appointment or continuityin service but he has right not to be dealt with arbitrarilyand exercise of power has to be in reasonable manner withCobjectivity having due regard to facts of cases.

36. What yardstick is to be applied has to depend upon thenature of post, higher post would involve more rigorouscriteria for all services, not only to uniformed service. Forlower posts which are not sensitive, nature of duties, impactDof suppression on suitability has to be considered byauthorities concerned considering post/nature of duties/services and power has to be exercised on due considerationof various aspects.”

57. The Court proceeded to hold further that chance ofEreformation should be afforded to the young offenders in suitable caseswhile exercising the power for cancelling candidature. The Courtthereafter summarised the discussion on the issue by way of laying downcertain guidelines as stated below:

“38. We have noticed various decisions and tried to explainFand reconcile them as far as possible. In view of aforesaiddiscussion, we summarize our conclusion thus:

38.1. Information given to the employer by candidate as toconviction, acquittal or arrest, or pendency of criminal case,whether before or after entering into service must be trueGand there should be no suppression or false mention ofrequired information.

38.2. While passing order of termination of services orcancellation of candidature for giving false information, theemployer may take notice of special circumstances of the case,Hif any, while giving such information.

38.3. The employer shall take into consideration theGovernment orders/instructions/rules, applicable to theemployee, at the time of taking the decision.

38.4. In case there is suppression or false information ofinvolvement in criminal case where conviction or acquittalhad already been recorded before filling of the application/verification form and such fact later comes to knowledge ofemployer, any of the following recourse appropriate to thecase may be adopted: -

38.4.1. In case trivial in nature in which conviction hadbeen recorded, such as shouting slogans at young age or fora petty offence which if disclosed would not have renderedan incumbent unfit for post in question, the employer may, inits discretion, ignore such suppression of fact or falseinformation by condoning the lapse.

38.4.2. Where conviction has been recorded in case which isnot trivial in nature, employer may cancel candidature orterminate services of the employee.

38.4.3. If acquittal had already been recorded in caseinvolving moral turpitude or offence of heinous/serious nature,on technical ground andit is not case of clean acquittal, orbenefit of reasonable doubt has been given, the employer mayconsider all relevant facts available as to antecedents, andmay take appropriate decision as to the continuance of theemployee.

38.5 In case where the employee has made declarationtruthfully of concluded criminal case, the employer still hasthe right to consider antecedents, and cannot be compelledto appoint the candidate.

38.6. In case when fact has been truthfully declared incharacter verification form regarding pendency of criminalcase of trivial nature, employer, in facts and circumstances ofthe case, in its discretion may appoint the candidate subjectto decision of such case.

38.7. In case of deliberate suppression of fact with respectto multiple pendingcases such false information by itself will

assume significance and an employer may pass appropriateorder cancelling candidature or terminating services asappointment of person against whom multiple criminal caseswere pending may not be proper.

38.8. If criminal case was pending but not known to theBcandidate at the time of filling the form, still it may haveadverse impact and the appointing authority would takedecision after considering the seriousness of the crime.

38.9. In case the employee is confirmed in service, holdingDepartmental enquiry would be necessary before passingCorder of termination/removal or dismissal on the ground ofsuppression or submitting false information in verificationform.

38.10. For determining suppression or false informationattestation/verification form has to be specific, not vague.DOnly such information which was required to be specificallymentioned has to be disclosed. If information not asked forbut is relevant comes to knowledge of the employer the samecan be considered in an objective manner while addressingthe question of fitness. However, in such cases action cannotbe taken on basis of suppression or submitting falseEinformation as to fact which was not even asked for.38.11. Before person is held guilty of suppressio veri orsuggestio falsi, knowledge of the fact must be attributable tohim.”

FPosition of law post Avtar Singh

58. In Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration and Othersv. Pradeep Kumar and Another, (2018) 1 SCC 797 the issue of therespondent therein being honourably acquitted and entitled to beingreinstated was raised. This Court, while relying upon Mehar Singh(supra) and holding that the nature of the offences must be looked into,Gheld as follows:

“13. It is thus well settled that acquittal in criminal casedoes not automatically entitlehim for appointment to the post.Still it is open to the employer to consider the antecedentsand examine whether he is suitable for appointment to the

post. From the observations of this Court in Mehar Singh(2013) 7 SCC 685 and Parvez Khan (2015) 2 SCC 591 cases,it is clear that candidate to be recruited to the police servicemust be of impeccable character and integrity. personhaving criminal antecedents will not fit in this category. Evenif he is acquitted or discharged, it cannot be presumed thathe was honourably acquitted/completely exonerated. Thedecision of the Screening Committee must be taken as finalunless it is shown to be mala fide. The Screening Committeealso must be alive to the importance of the trust reposed in itand must examine the candidate with utmost character.

x x x x

15. From the above details, we find that the ScreeningCommittee examined each and every case of the respondentsand reasonings for their acquittal and taken the decision.While deciding whether person involved in criminal casehas been acquitted or discharged should be appointed to apost in police force, nature of offence in which he is involved,whether it was an honourable acquittal or only an extensionof benefit of doubt because of witnesses turned hostile andflaws in the prosecution are all the aspects to be consideredby the Screening Committee for taking the decision whetherthe candidate is suitable for the post.”

[Emphasis supplied]

59. In the case of State of Madhya Pradesh and Others v.Bunty, (2020) 17 SCC 654, the candidate had not disclosed the fact thathe had criminal proceedings pending against him at the time ofverification. The criminal proceedings were based on the candidateimpersonating police officer and this Court treated it to be casewhich involved moral turpitude. The candidate was granted benefit ofdoubt. The candidate had been acquitted on the technical ground of awitness being held hostile. This Court held that the perception formed bythe Screening Committee, that he was unfit to be inducted in the disciplinedpolice force, was appropriate. Further it was held that, the decision ofthe Scrutiny Committee could not be said to be such which warrantedjudicial interference unless there is mala fide intent involved.

60. In the case of State of Rajasthan and Others v. Love KushMeena, (2021) 8 SCC 774, the respondent was charged under Sections

A302, 323, 341/34 resply of the IPC and was acquitted as the prosecutionfailed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The witnesses hadturned hostile. The candidate had disclosed the said fact at the time ofapplying; however, his appointment was cancelled relying on Avtar Singh(supra). This Court held as under:

B“24. Examining the controversy in the present case in theconspectus of the aforesaid legal position, what is importantto note is the fact that the view of this Court has depended onthe nature of offence charged and the result of the same. Themere fact ofan acquittal would not suffice but rather it woulddepend on whether it is clean acquittal based on totalCabsence of evidence or in the criminal jurisprudencerequiring the case to be proved beyond reasonable doubt,that parameter having not been met, benefit of doubt has beengranted to the accused. …

x x x x

26. The judgment in Avtar Singh’s case (2016) 8 SCC 471 onthe relevant parameter extracted aforesaid clearly stipulatesthat where in respect of heinous or serious nature of crimethe acquittal is based on benefit of reasonable doubt, thatcannot make the candidateeligible.”

[Emphasis supplied]

61. In the case of Union of India and Others v. Methu Meda,(2022) 1 SCC1, the respondent had applied for the post of constable inthe CISF and was selected. The respondent had disclosed about theFcase in which he was acquitted. However, his selection was subsequentlycancelled. The respondent challenged the same vide writ petition, whichthe High Court allowed. This Court, however, set aside the High Court’sorder and discussed the consequence of an acquittal on technical grounds.It was also reiterated that person joining the police force must be ofimpeccable character and must not have any criminal antecedents. ThisGCourt held as under:

“17. In view of the above, in the facts of the present case, asper paras 38.3, 38.4.3 and 38.5 of Avtar Singh case (supra)(2016) 8 SCC 471, it is clear that the employer is havingright to consider the suitability of the candidate as perHgovernment orders/instructions/rules at the time of taking the

decision for induction of the candidate in employment.Acquittal on technical ground in respect of the offences ofheinous/serious nature, which is not clean acquittal, theemployer may have right to consider all relevant factsavailable as to the antecedents, and may take appropriatedecision as to the continuance of the employee. Even in case,truthful declaration regarding concluded trial has been madeby the employee, still the employer has the right to considerantecedents and cannot be compelled to appoint thecandidate.

x x x x

20. In view of the aforesaid, it is clear the respondent whowishes to join the police force must be person of utmostrectitude and have impeccable character and integrity.Aperson having criminal antecedents would not be fit in thiscategory. The employer is having right to consider the natureof acquittal or decide until he is completely exoneratedbecause even possibility of his taking to the life of crimesposes threat to the discipline of the police force. TheStanding Order, therefore, has entrusted the task of takingdecisions in these matters to the Screening Committee and the

decision of the Committee would be final unless malafide. …21. As discussed hereinabove, the law is well-settled. If aperson is acquitted giving himthe benefit of doubt, from thecharge of an offence involving moral turpitude or becausethe witnesses turned hostile, it would not automatically entitlehim for the employment, that too in disciplined force. Theemployer is having right to consider his candidature in termsof the circulars issued by the Screening Committee. The meredisclosure of the offences alleged and the result of the trial isnot sufficient. In the said situation, the employer cannot becompelled to give appointment to the candidate. ….”

[Emphasis supplied]

62. In the Union of India (UOI) v. Dilip Kumar Mallick, (2022)6 Scale 108, CRPF officer had suppressed the fact that the proceedingsunder the IPC were pending against him. The Court, while referring toAvtar Singh (supra), held that the suppression can be ground for an

Aemployer to cancel the candidature or to terminate the services. Therespondent served in the organization since 2003 and continued to remainas an under trial accused without theknowledge of the organisation. Therespondent received an honourable acquittal from the trial court. ThisCourt held as under:B“13. Thus, it remains beyond the pale of doubt that the cases

B“13. Thus, it remains beyond the pale of doubt that the casesof non-disclosure of material information and of submittingfalse information have been treated as being of equal gravityby this Court and it is laid down in no uncertain terms thatnon-disclosure by itself may be ground for an employer tocancel the candidature or to terminate services.Even in theCsummation above- quoted, this Court has emphasized thatinformation given to the employer by candidate as to criminalcase including the factors of arrest or pendency of the case,whether before or after entering into service, must be trueand there should be no suppression or false mention of theDrequired information.

14. In case of suppression, when the facts later come to theknowledge of employer, different courses of action may beadopted by the employer depending on the nature of fault asalso the nature of default; and this Court has indicated thatEif the case is of trivial nature, like that of shouting slogans ata young age etc., the employer may ignore such suppressionof fact or false information depending on the factors as towhether the information, if disclosed, would have renderedincumbent unfit for the post in question.

14.1. However, the aforesaid observations do not lead to thecorollary that in case of the present nature where criminalcase was indeed pending against the respondent and the factswere altogether omitted from being mentioned, the employerwould be obliged to ignore such defaults and shortcomings.

16. In the given set of facts and circumstances, wheresuppression of relevant information is not matter of dispute,there cannot be any legal basis for the Court to interfere inthe manner that the employer be directed to impose ‘any lesser

punishment’, as directed by the Division Bench of the HighCourt.The submissions seeking to evoke sympathy and callingfor leniency cannot lead to any relief in favour of therespondent.”

[Emphasis supplied]

63. In the case of Pawan Kumar v. Union of India, (2022) SCCOnLine SC 532, case was registered against the appellant for theoffences punishable under Sections 148, 149, 323, 356 and 506 resply ofthe IPC. The appellant was honourably acquitted. However, the fact ofthe said criminal prosecution was not disclosed in the attestation formfilled by the petitioner. On such ground, the appellant was dischargedfrom service. The High Court upheld the discharge. While allowing theappeal, this Court held as follows:

“13. What emerges from the exposition as laid down by thisCourt is that by mere suppression of material/false informationregardless of the fact whether there is conviction or acquittalhas been recorded, the employee/recruit is not to bedischarged/terminated axiomatically from service just by astroke of pen. At the same time, the effect of suppression ofmaterial/false information involving in criminal case, if any,is left for the employer to consider all the relevant facts andcircumstancesavailable as to antecedents and keeping in viewthe objective criteria and the relevant service rules intoconsideration, while taking appropriate decision regardingcontinuance/suitability of the employee into service. Whatbeing noticed by this Court is that mere suppression ofmaterial/false information in given case does not mean thatthe employer can arbitrarily discharge/terminate the employeefrom service.

x x x x

18. The criminal case indeed was of trivial nature and thenature of post and nature of duties to be discharged by therecruit has never been looked into by the competent authoritywhile examining the overall suitability of the incumbentkeeping in view Rule 52 of the Rules 1987 to become memberof the force. Taking into consideration the expositionexpressed by this Court in Avtar Singh (supra), in our

Aconsidered view the order of discharge passed by thecompetent authority dated 24th April, 2015 is not sustainableand in sequel thereto the judgment passed by the DivisionBench of High Court of Delhi does not hold good and deservesto be set aside.”

[Emphasis supplied]

64. In the case of Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran NigamLimited and another v. Anil Kanwariya, (2021) 10 SCC 136, this Courtgave altogether different dimension to the issue in question. In the saidcase, the respondent had applied for the post of Technical Helper on theestablishment of the appellant Nigam. The respondent was appointed asCa Technical Helper on probation for period of two years w.e.f.06.05.2015. The appointment of the respondent was subjected to theproduction of character certificate/verification report to be issued bythe Superintendent of Police of the native district of the respondent. TheSuperintendent, Sawai Madhopur vide his report dated 05.06.2015informed the appellant that criminal case bearing No. 13 of 2011 forDthe offences punishable under Sections 143, 341 and 323 resply of theIPC was registered against the respondent and the respondent came tobe convicted vide the judgment and order dated 05.08.2013 passed bythe trial court. The report of Superintendent of Police further stated thatthe respondent was given the benefit under the Probation of OffendersEAct, 1958. In other words, although the respondent stood convicted forthe alleged offence yet the trial court thought fit to release him onprobation. This fact was supressed by the respondent at the time of hisappointment. In such circumstances, action was taken and ultimatelythe respondent’s services came to be terminated. The respondentchallenged the order of termination in the High Court. The learned SingleFJudge of the High Court set aside the order of termination and directedthe appellant to reinstate the respondent. The appellant Nigam preferredan intra-court appeal before the Division Bench. The appeal came to bedismissed. The appellant Nigam ultimately came to this Court andchallenged the orders passed by the High Court. This Court while allowingthe appeal filed by the Nigam held in Para 14 as under:G

“14. The issue/question may be considered from another angle,from the employer’s point of view. The question is not aboutwhether an employee was involved in dispute of trivial natureand whether he has been subsequently acquitted or not. Thequestion is about the credibility and/or trustworthiness of suchHan employee who at the initial stage of the employment, i.e.,

while submitting the declaration/verification and/or applyingfor post made false declaration and/or not disclosing and/or suppressing material fact of having involved in criminalcase. If the correct facts would have been disclosed, theemployer might not have appointed him. Then the question isof TRUST. Therefore, in such situation, where the employerfeels that an employee who at the initial stage itself has madea false statement and/or not disclosed the material facts and/or suppressed the material facts and therefore he cannot becontinued in service because such an employee cannot berelied upon even in future, the employer cannot be forced tocontinue such an employee. The choice/option whether tocontinue or not to continue such an employee always must begiven to the employer. At the cost of repetition, it is observedand as observed hereinabove in catena of decision such anemployee cannot claim the appointment and/orcontinue to bein service as matter of right.”

[Emphasis Supplied]

65. Thus, this Court took the view that irrespective of the factwhether the dispute is of trivial nature or not, it is the credibility/trustworthiness of particular employee which matters the most whenit comes to public employment. This Court took the view that if particularemployee supresses something important or makes any false declarationwith view to secure public employment then such employee could besaid to have exhibited tendency which is likely to shake the confidenceof the employer. In such circumstances, it would be within the discretionof the employer whether to continue or not to continue such an employeewho has exhibited tendency which reflects on his overall character orcredibility.

66. We now proceed to look into the decision of this Court in thecase of Mohammed Imran v. State of Maharashtra and Others (2019)17 SCC 696, upon which strong reliance has been placed on behalf ofthe appellant herein. In the said case, the appellant Mohammed Imranwas denied appointment in judicial service on the ground of moral turpitudeas he had to face criminal prosecution for the offences punishable underSections 363 and 366 resply r/w 34 of the IPC. The appellant had beenacquitted of the charge under Sections 363 and 366 r/w 34 of the IPCmuch before he cleared the examination for appointment in the judicialservice in the year 2009. Thus, it was case wherein the criminal

Aprosecution came in the way of the appellant. Although he stood acquittedby the trial court yet he was denied appointment on the ground of “MoralTurpitude”. The appellant lost before the High Court of Bombay. ThisCourt while allowing his appeal observed as under:

“5. Employment opportunities are scarce commodity in ourcountry. Every advertisement invites large number ofBaspirants for limited number of vacancies. But that may notsuffice to invoke sympathy for grant of relief where thecredentials of the candidate may raise serious questionsregarding suitability, irrespective of eligibility. Undoubtedly,judicial service is very different from other services and theCyardstick of suitability that may apply to other services, maynot be the same for judicial service. But there cannot beany mechanical or rhetorical incantation of moral turpitude,to deny appointment in judicial service simplicitor. Much willdepend on the facts of case. Every individual deserves anopportunity to improve, learn from the past and move aheadDin life by self- improvement. To make past conduct,irrespective of all considerations, an albatross around theneck of the candidate, may not always constitute justice.Much will, however depend on the fact situation of case.

6. That the expression “moral turpitude” is not capable ofEprecise definition was considered in Pawan Kumar v. State ofHaryana, [(1996) 4 SCC 17 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 583] , opining: (SCC p. 21, para 12)

“12. “Moral turpitude” is an expression which is used inlegal as also societal parlance to describe conduct whichis inherently base, vile, depraved or having any connectionFshowing depravity.”

7. The appellant by dint of hard academic labour wassuccessful at the competitive examination held on 16- 8-2009and after viva voce was selected and recommended forappointment by the Maharashtra Public Service CommissionGon 14-10-2009. In his attestation form, he had duly disclosedhis prosecution and acquittal. Mere disclosure in anappropriate case may not be sufficient to hold for suitabilityin employment. Nonetheless the nature of allegations and theconduct in the facts of case would certainly be relevantfactor. While others so recommended came to be appointed,

the selection of the appellant was annulled on 4-6-2010 inview of the character verification report of the police.

8. It is an undisputed fact that one Shri Sudhir GulabraoBarde, who had been acquitted on 24-11-2009 in Case No.3022 of 2007 under Sections 294, 504 and 34 IPC, has beenappointed. We are not convinced, that in the facts andcircumstances of the present case, the appellant could bediscriminated and denied appointment arbitrarily when boththe appointments were in judicial service, by the same selectionprocedure, of persons who faced criminal prosecutions andwere acquitted. The distinction sought to be drawn by therespondents, that the former was not involved in case ofmoral turpitude does not leave us convinced. In JoginderSingh [Joginder Singh v. State (UT of Chandigarh), (2015) 2SCC 377: (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 490], it was observed asfollows: (SCC pp. 383-84, para 25)

“25. Further, apart from small dent in the name of thiscriminal case in which he has been honourably acquitted,there is no other material on record to indicate that theantecedents or the conduct of the appellant was not up tothe mark to appoint him to the post.”

9. In the present proceedings, on 23-3-2018 [Mohd. Imran v.State of Maharashtra, (2019) 17 SCC 700], this Court hadcalled for confidential report of the character verificationas also the antecedents of the appellant as on this date. Thereport received reveals that except for the criminal case underreference in which he has been acquitted, the appellant has aclean record and there is no adverse material against him todeny him the fruits of his academic labour in competitiveselection for the post of judicial officer. In our opinion, noreasonable person on the basis of the materials placed beforeus can come to the conclusion that the antecedents andcharacter of the appellant are such that he is unfit to beappointed as judicial officer. An alleged single misadventureor misdemeanour of the present nature, if it can be consideredto be so, cannot be sufficient to deny appointment to theappellant when he has on all other aspects and parametersbeen found to be fit for appointment. The law is well settledin this regard in Avtar Singh v. Union of India [(2016) 8 SCC

ABC

A471 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 425] . If empanelment creates noright to appointment, equally there can be no arbitrary denialof appointment after empanelment.

10. In the entirety of the facts and circumstances of the case,we are of the considered opinion that the consideration ofthe candidature of the appellant and its rejection are afflictedBby myopic vision, blurred by the spectacle of what has beendescribed as moral turpitude, reflecting inadequateappreciation and application of facts also, as justice maydemand.

11. We, therefore, consider the present fit case to set asideCthe order dated 4-6-2010 and the impugned order [Mohd.Imran v. State of Maharashtra, 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 9939]dismissing the writ petition, and direct the respondents toreconsider the candidature of the appellant. Let such freshconsideration be done and an appropriate decision be takenin the light of the present discussion, preferably within aDmaximum period of eight weeks from the date of receipt andproduction of the copy of the present order. In order to avoidany future litigation on seniority or otherwise, we make itclear that in the event of appointment, the appellant shall notbe entitled to any other reliefs.”E67. Thus, this Court took the view that although employmentopportunity is scarce commodity in the present times being circumscribedwithin limited vacancies yet by itself may not suffice to invoke sympathyfor grant of relief where the credentials of candidate may raise anyquestion regarding his suitability, irrespective of eligibility. However, atthe same time, this Court observed that there should not be any mechanicalFor rhetorical incantation of moral turpitude to deny appointment in agovernment service simplicitor which would depend on the facts of eachcase. The judicial philosophy flowing through the mind of the judges isthat every individual deserves an opportunity to improve, learn from thepast and move ahead in life for self-improvement. To make past conduct,irrespective of all considerations, may not always constitute justice. ItGwould all depend on the fact situation of the given case.

68. The only reason to refer to and look into the various decisionsrendered by this Court as above over period of time is that the principlesof law laid therein governing the subject are bit inconsistent. Even after,the larger Bench decision in the case of Avtar Singh (supra) differentHcourts have enunciated different principles.

69. In such circumstances, we undertook some exercise to shortlistthe broad principles of law which should be made applicable to thelitigations of the present nature. The principles are as follows:

a) Each case should be scrutinised thoroughly by the publicemployer concerned, through its designated officials–more so,in the case of recruitment for the police force, who are undera duty to maintain order, and tackle lawlessness, since theirability to inspire public confidence is bulwark to society’ssecurity. [See Raj Kumar (supra)]

b) Even in case where the employee has made declarationtruthfully and correctly of concluded criminal case, theemployer still has the right to consider the antecedents, andcannot be compelled to appoint the candidate. The acquittal ina criminal case would not automatically entitle candidate forappointment to the post. It would be still open to the employerto consider the antecedents and examine whether the candidateconcerned is suitable and fit for appointment to the post.

c) The suppression of material information and making falsestatement in the verification Form relating to arrest, prosecution,conviction etc., has clear bearing on the character, conductand antecedents of the employee. If it is found that theemployee had suppressed or given false information in regardto the matters having bearing on his fitness or suitability tothe post, he can be terminated from service.

d) The generalisations about the youth, career prospects andage of the candidates leading to condonation of the offenders’conduct, should not enter the judicial verdict and should beavoided.

e)The Court should inquire whether the Authority concernedwhose action is being challenged acted mala fide.

f)Is there any element of bias in the decision of the Authority?g)Whether the procedure of inquiry adopted by the Authorityconcerned was fair and reasonable?

Scope of Appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution

70. Article 136 of the Constitution empowers the Supreme Courtto grant special leave in its discretion against any judgment, decree,determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or madeby any court or tribunal except by any court or tribunal constituted by orunder any law relating to the armed forces. It reads as under:

A“136. Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court.—

(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the SupremeCourt may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appealfrom any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or orderin any cause or matter passed or made by any court ortribunal in the territory of India.B

(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment,determination, sentence or order passed or made by any courtor tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to theArmed Forces.”

71. The jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 is divisible into twoCstages: the first stage is upto the disposal of prayer for the special leaveto file an appeal and the second stage commences, if and when, theleave to appeal is granted and the special leave petition is converted intoan appeal. The legal position as summarised by this Court inKunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359; affirmed inDKhoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Mahadeshwara Sahakara SakkareKarkhane Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 376, regarding the scope of two stagesreads as under:

“(1) While hearing the petition for special leave to appeal,the Court is called upon to see whether the petitioner shouldbe granted such leave or not. While hearing such petition,Ethe Court is not exercising its appellate jurisdiction; it is merelyexercising its discretionary jurisdiction to grant or not to grantleave to appeal. The petitioner is still outside the gate of entrythough aspiring to enter the appellate arena of the SupremeCourt. Whether he enters or not would depend on the fate ofFhis petition for special leave;

(2) If the petition seeking grant of leave to appeal is dismissed,it is an expression of opinion by the Court that case forinvoking appellate jurisdiction of the Court was not madeout.

(3) If leave to appeal is granted, the appellate jurisdiction ofGthe Court stands invoked; the gate for entry in the appellatearena is opened. The petitioner is in and the respondent mayalso be called upon to face him, though in an appropriatecase, in spite of having granted leave to appeal, the Courtmay dismiss the appeal without noticing the respondent.H(4) In spite of petition for special leave to appeal having

been filed, the judgment, decree or order against which leaveto appeal has been sought for, continues to be final, effectiveand binding as between the parties. Once leave to appealhas been granted, the finality of the judgment, decree or orderappealed against is put in jeopardy though it continues to bebinding and effective between the parties unless it is nullityor unless the Court may pass specific order staying orsuspending the operation or execution of the judgment, decreeor order under challenge.”

72. In Pritam Singh v. State, AIR 1950 SC 169, the ConstitutionBench of this Court has explained the scope and powers of this Courtunder Article 136 of the Constitution in detail:

“9. On careful examination of Article 136 along with thepreceding article, it seems clear that the wide discretionarypower with which this Court is invested under it is to beexercised sparingly and in exceptional cases only, and as faras possible more or less uniform standard should be adoptedin granting special leave in the wide range of matters whichcan come up before it under this article. By virtue of thisarticle, we can grant special leave in civil cases, in criminalcases, in income tax cases, in cases which come up beforedifferent kinds of tribunals and in variety of other cases.The only uniform standard which in our opinion can be laiddown in the circumstances is that Court should grant specialleave to appeal only in those cases where special circumstancesare shown to exist.The Privy Council have tried to lay downfrom time to time certain principles for granting special leavein criminal cases, which were reviewed by the Federal Courtin Kapildeo v. King. It is sufficient for our purpose to say thatthough we are not bound to follow them too rigidly since thereasons, constitutional and administrative, which sometimesweighed with the Privy Council, need not weigh with us, yetsome of those principles are useful as furnishing in manycases sound basis for invoking the discretion of this Courtin granting special leave. Generally speaking, this Court willnot grant special leave, unless it is shown that exceptionaland special circumstances exist, that substantial and graveinjustice has been done and that the case in question presentsfeatures of sufficient gravity to warrant review of the decisionappealed against.Since the present case does not in our

Aopinion fulfil any of these conditions, we cannot interferewith the decision of the High Court, and the appeal must bedismissed.”

[Emphasis supplied]

73. three-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Hem Raj,BSon of Devilal Mahajan of Bijainagar, Condemned Prisoner, atPresent Confined in the Central Jail, Ajmer v. State of Ajmer, AIR1954 SC 462, held as under:

“2. Unless it is shown that exceptional and specialcircumstances exist that substantial and grave injustice hasbeen done and the case in question presents features ofCsufficient gravity to warrant review of the decision appealedagainst, this Court does not exercise its overriding powersunder Article 136(1) of the Constitution and the circumstancethat because the appeal has been admitted by special leavedoes not entitle the appellant to open out the whole case andDcontest all the findings of fact and raise every point whichcould be raised in the High Court. Even at the final hearingonly those points can be urged which are fit to be urged atthe preliminary stage when the leave to appeal is asked for.The question for consideration is whether this test is satisfiedin either of these two appeals.After hearing the learnedEcounsel in both the appeals we are satisfied that none of themraise any questions which fall within the rule enunciatedabove.”

[Emphasis supplied]

74. The Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of P.S.R.FSadhanantham v. Arunachalam and Another, (1980) 3 SCC 141, hasexplained the Article 136 of the Constitution as under:

“7. …..In express terms, Article 136 does not confer rightof appeal on party as such but it confers wide discretionarypower on the Supreme Court to interfere in suitable cases.The discretionary dimension is considerable but that relatesGto the power of the court. The question is whether it spells byimplication, fair procedure as contemplated by Article 21.In our view, it does. Article 136 is special jurisdiction. It isresiduary power; it is extraordinary in its amplitude, its limit,when it chases injustice, is the sky itself. This CourtHfunctionally fulfils itself by reaching out to injustice whereverit is and this power is largely derived in the common run ofcases from Article 136. Is it merely power in the court to beexercised in any manner it fancies? Is there no procedurallimitation in the manner of exercise and the occasion forexercise? Is there no duty to act fairly while hearing caseunder Article 136, either in the matter of grant of leave or,after such grant, in the final disposal of the appeal? We havehardly any doubt that here is procedure necessarily implicitin the power vested in the summit court. It must be rememberedthat Article 136 confers jurisdiction on the highest court. Thefounding fathers unarguably intended in the very terms ofArticle 136 that it shall be exercised by the highest judges ofthe land with scrupulous adherence to judicial principles wellestablished by precedents in our jurisprudence. Judicialdiscretion is canalised authority, not arbitrary eccentricity.Cardozo, with elegant accuracy, has observed: [BenjaminCardozo : The Nature Of The Judicial Process, Yale UniversityPress (1921)]

“The Judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free.He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not knight-errantroaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or ofgoodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecratedprinciples. It is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vagueand unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise discretioninformed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplinedby system, and subordinated to ‘the primordial necessityof order in the social life’. Wide enough in all conscienceis the field of discretion that remains.”

8. It is manifest that Article 136 is of composite structure, ispower-cum-procedure — power in that it vests jurisdiction inthe Supreme Court, and procedure in that it spells mode ofhearing. It obligates the exercise of judicial discretion andthe mode of hearing so characteristic of the court process. Inshort, there is an in-built prescription of power and procedurein terms of Article 136 which meets the demand of Article 21.9. We may eye the issue slightly differently. If Article 21 istelescoped into Article 136, the conclusion follows that fairprocedure is imprinted on the special leave that the court maygrant or refuse. When motion is made for leave to appealagainst an acquittal, this Court appreciates the gravity of the

ABC

Aperil to personal liberty involved in that proceeding. It is fairto assume that while considering the petition under Article136 the court will pay attention to the question of liberty, theperson who seeks such leave from the court, his motive andhis locus standi and the weighty factors which persuade thecourt to grant special leave. When this conspectus ofBprocessual circumstances and criteria play upon thejurisdiction of the court under Article 136, it is reasonable toconclude that the desideratum of fair procedure implied inArticle 21 is adequately answered.

xxx xxx xxx

C11. The wider the discretionary power the more sparing itsexercise. Times out of number this Court has stressed thatthough parties promiscuously “provoke” this jurisdiction, thecourt parsimoniously invokes the power. Moreover, the courtmay not, save in special situations, grant leave to one who isnot eo nomine party on the record. Thus, proceduralDlimitations exist and are governed by well worn rules ofguidance.”

[Emphasis supplied]

75. Thus, the principles of law discernible from the aforesaid arethat unless, it is shown that exceptional and special circumstances exist;Ethat substantial and grave injustice have been done and the case andquestion present features of sufficient gravity to warrant review of thedecision appealed against, this Court would not exercise its overridingpowers under Article 136(1) of the Constitution. The wide discretionarypower with which this Court is invested under Article 136 is to beFexercised sparingly and in exceptional cases only.76. In so far as the Appeal arising out of the Special Leave Petition(C) No. 20860 of 2019 filed by Satish Chandra Yadav is concerned, thesame should fail. We are not at all convinced with the case put forwardby Satish Chandra Yadav for informing the respondent herein that therewas no criminal case pending against him on the date he filled up theGverification form. The explanation offered by Satish Chandra Yadav isnothing but his own understanding of what is prosecution and pendencyof criminal case. If he knows that trial is deemed to have commencedwith the framing of charge, then we are sure he knows and understandswhat is criminal prosecution.

77. Indisputably, Satish Chandra Yadav was still under probationat the time, his services had been terminated. It is also apparent fromthe record that Satish Chandra Yadav had been given appointment onprobation subject to the verification of facts given in the verificationForm. To our mind, therefore, if an enquiry revealed that the facts givenwere wrong, the respondent herein was at liberty to dispense with theservices of the appellant Satish Chandra Yadav as the question of anystigma and penal consequences at this stage would not arise. It bearsrepetition that what has led to the termination of the services of theappellant Satish Chandra Yadav is not his involvement in the criminalcase which was then pending, and in which he had been acquittedsubsequently but the fact that he had withheld relevant information whilefilling in the verification Form. He could be said to have exhibited ordisplayed such tendency which shook the confidence of the respondent.

78. Administrative law has traditionally approached the review ofdecisions classified as discretionary separately from those seen asinvolving the interpretation of rules of law. The rule has been that thedecisions classified as discretionary may only be reviewed on limitedgrounds such as the bad faith of decision-makers, the exercise ofdiscretion for an improper purpose, and the use of irrelevantconsiderations. general doctrine of “unreasonableness” has alsosometimes been applied to the discretionary decisions. In our opinion,these doctrines incorporate two central ideas — those discretionarydecisions, like all other administrative decisions, must be made withinthe bounds of the jurisdiction conferred by the statutory rules, but thatconsiderable deference will be given to the decision-makers by the courtsin reviewing the exercise of that discretion and determining the scope ofthe decision-makers’ jurisdiction. These doctrines recognise that it is theintention of legislature, when using statutory language that confersbroad choices on the administrative agencies, that courts should not lightlyinterfere with such decisions, and should give considerable respect tothe decision-makers when reviewing the manner in which discretionwas exercised. However, discretion must still be exercised in mannerthat is within reasonable interpretation of the margin of manoeuvrecontemplated by the legislature, in accordance with the principles of therule of law.

79. Ms. Madhavi Divan, the learned ASG has rightly relied onKendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan (supra) in which this Court held thatthe purpose of requiring an employee to furnish information regardingprosecution/conviction, etc. in the verification Form was to assess his

Acharacter and antecedents for the purpose of employment andcontinuation in service; that suppression of material information andmaking false statement in reply to the queries relating to prosecutionand conviction had clear bearing on the character, conduct andantecedents of the employee; and that where it is found that the employeehad suppressed or given false information in regard to the matters whichBhad bearing on his fitness or suitability to the post, he could be terminatedfrom service during the period of probation without holding any inquiry.This Court also made it clear that neither the gravity of the criminaloffence nor the ultimate acquittal therein was relevant when consideringwhether probationer who suppresses material fact (of his beingCinvolved in criminal case, in the personal information furnished to theemployer), is fit to be continued as probationer.80. We find that the observations in the aforesaid case are fullyapplicable to the appeal filed by Satish Chandra Yadav. We are of theopinion that it was deliberate attempt on the part of the appellant SatishChandra Yadav to withhold the relevant information and it is this omissionDwhich has led to the termination of his service during the probation period.81. In view of the aforesaid, the Appeal arising out of the SpecialLeave Petition (C) No. 20860 of 2019 filed by Satish Chandra Yadavfails and is hereby dismissed.

82. So far as the connected Appeal arising out of the SpecialELeave Petition (C) No. 5170 of 2021 filed by Pushpendra Kumar Yadavis concerned, the same also fails on the very same line of reasoningadopted by us. The only difference in the case of the appellant PushpendraKumar Yadav is that he had put in about four years of service before hecame to be terminated.

F83. In the result, both the appeals fail and are hereby dismissedwith no order as to costs.

84. Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.

Divya Pandey(Assisted by : Mahendra Yadav, LCRA)G

Appeals dismissed.