RAMAWATAR versus STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

RAMAWATAR

STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

(Criminal Appeal No. 1393 of 2011)

OCTOBER 25, 2021

[N. V. RAMANA, CJI, SURYA KANT ANDHIMA KOHLI, JJ.]

Constitution of India: Art.142 – Prosecution case was thatthere was property dispute between the two neighbours appellantand complainant – Complaint was filed under SC/ST Act againstthe appellant that he abused complainant with repeated referenceto her caste – Courts below convicted the appellant under SC/STAct – In the instant appeal, complainant filed an application forcompromise – Held: The record manifests that there was anundeniable pre-existing civil dispute between the parties – Thus,the genesis of the deprecated incident was civil/property dispute –Nothing on record indicated that either before or after the purportedcompromise, any untoward incident had transpired between theparties – Complainant, on her own free will, without any compulsion,entered into compromise and wished to drop the criminalproceedings against the appellant – Appellant and the complainantwere residents of the same village and lived in very close proximityto each other – They themselves had voluntarily settled theirdifferences – Therefore, in order to avoid the revival of healedwounds, and to advance peace and harmony, it will be prudent toeffectuate the settlement – By invoking the powers under Art.142,the instant criminal proceedings are quashed with the sole objectiveof doing complete justice between the parties – Scheduled Castesand the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – Codeof Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Compromise/Settlement.

Constitution of India: Art.142 – Invocation of, for quashingof criminal proceedings involving non-heinous crime on the basisof voluntary compromise between the complainant/victim and theaccused – Held: When considering prayer for quashing on thebasis of compromise/settlement, if the Court is satisfied that theunderlying objective of the Act would not be contravened or

Adiminished even if the felony in question goes unpunished, the merefact that the offence is covered under ‘special statute’ would notrefrain Supreme Court or the High Court, from exercising theirrespective powers under Art.142 of the Constitution or s.482 Cr.P.C.– Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention ofAtrocities) Act, 1989 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482.B

Constitution of India: Art.142 – Powers to quash theproceedings, scope of – Ordinarily, when dealing with offencesarising out of special statutes such as the SC/ST Act, the Court willbe extremely circumspect in its approach – The SC/ST Act has beenspecifically enacted to deter acts of indignity, humiliation andCharassment against members of Scheduled Castes and ScheduledTribes – Where it appears to the Court that the offence althoughcovered under the SC/ST Act, is primarily private or civil in nature,or where the alleged offence has not been committed on account ofthe caste of the victim, or where the continuation of the legalDproceedings would be an abuse of the process of law, the Courtcan exercise its powers to quash the proceedings – Scheduled Castesand the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention ofAtrocities) Act, 1989: Object of the Act – Held: The SC/ST Act hasEbeen specifically enacted to deter acts of indignity, humiliation andharassment against members of Scheduled Castes and ScheduledTribes – The Act is also recognition of the depressing reality thatdespite undertaking several measures, the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes continue to be subjected to various atrocities atthe hands of upper-castes – The Act has been enacted keeping inFview the express constitutional safeguards enumerated in Arts.15,17 and 21 of the Constitution, with twin-fold objective ofprotecting the members of these vulnerable communities as well asto provide relief and rehabilitation to the victims of caste-basedatrocities – Constitution of India – Arts.15, 17 and 21.GAllowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. This Court or the High Court, as the case maybe, after having given due regard to the nature of the offence andthe fact that the victim/complainant has willingly entered into asettlement/compromise, can quash proceedings in exercise ofH

their respective constitutional/inherent powers. However, thepowers under Article 142 or under Section 482 Cr.P.C., areexercisable in post-conviction matters only where an appeal ispending before one or the other Judicial forum. This is on thepremise that an order of conviction does not attain finality till theaccused has exhausted his/her legal remedies and the finality issub-judice before an appellate court. The pendency of legalproceedings, be that may before the final Court, is sine-qua-nonto involve the superior court’s plenary powers to do completejustice. Conversely, where settlement has ensued post theattainment of all legal remedies, the annulment of proceedingson the basis of compromise would be impermissible. Such anembargo is necessitated to prevent the accused from gaining anindefinite leverage, for such settlement/compromise will alwaysbe loaded with lurking suspicion about its bona fide. The purposeof these extra-ordinary powers is not to incentivise any hollow-hearted agreements between the accused and the victim but todo complete justice by effecting genuine settlement(s).[Paras 10, 13][508-H; 509-A-D]

Ramgopal & Anr. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh 2021(11) SCALE 555 – affirmed.

2.1 Even though the powers of this Court under Article142 are wide and far-reaching, the same cannot be exercised in avacuum. True it is that ordinary statutes or any restrictionscontained therein, cannot be constructed as limitation on theCourt’s power to do “complete justice”. However, this is not tosay that this Court can altogether ignore the statutory provisionsor other express prohibitions in law. In fact, the Court is obligatedto take note of the relevant laws and will have to regulate the useof its power and discretion accordingly. [Para 14][509-D-E]

Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India & Anr.(1998) 4 SCC 409 : [1998] 2 SCR 795 – followed.

2.2 Ordinarily, when dealing with offences arising out ofspecial statutes such as the SC/ST Act, the Court will be extremelycircumspect in its approach. The SC/ST Act has been specificallyenacted to deter acts of indignity, humiliation and harassment

Aagainst members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. TheAct is also recognition of the depressing reality that despiteundertaking several measures, the Scheduled Castes/ScheduledTribes continue to be subjected to various atrocities at the handsof upper-castes. The Act has been enacted keeping in view theexpress constitutional safeguards enumerated in Articles 15, 17Band 21 of the Constitution, with twin-fold objective of protectingthe members of these vulnerable communities as well as toprovide relief and rehabilitation to the victims of caste-basedatrocities. [Para 15][510-C-E]2.3 On the other hand, where it appears to the Court thatCthe offence in question, although covered under the SC/ST Act,is primarily private or civil in nature, or where the alleged offencehas not been committed on account of the caste of the victim, orwhere the continuation of the legal proceedings would be an abuseof the process of law, the Court can exercise its powers to quash

Dthe proceedings. On similar lines, when considering prayer forquashing on the basis of compromise/settlement, if the Courtis satisfied that the underlying objective of the Act would not becontravened or diminished even if the felony in question goesunpunished, the mere fact that the offence is covered under a‘special statute’ would not refrain this Court or the High Court,Efrom exercising their respective powers under Article 142 of theConstitution or Section 482 Cr.P.C. In cases such as the present,the Courts ought to be even more vigilant to ensure that thecomplainant-victim has entered into the compromise on thevolition of his/her free will and not on account of any duress. ItFcannot be understated that since members of the Scheduled Casteand Scheduled Tribe belong to the weaker sections of our country,they are more prone to acts of coercion, and therefore ought tobe accorded higher level of protection. If the Courts find evena hint of compulsion or force, no relief can be given to the accusedparty. What factors the Courts should consider, would dependGon the facts and circumstances of each case. [Paras 16, 18][510-F-H; 511-C-E]

2.4 By invoking the powers under Article 142, the instantCriminal proceedings are quashed with the sole objective of doingcomplete justice between the parties for the reasons that: Firstly,H

the very purpose behind Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST is to detercaste-based insults and intimidations when they are used withthe intention of demeaning victim on account of he/she belongingto the Scheduled Caste/ Scheduled Tribe community. In thepresent case, the record manifests that there was an undeniablepre-existing civil dispute between the parties. Considering thisaspect, it would not be incorrect to categorise the occurrence asone being overarchingly private in nature, having only subtleundertones of criminality, even though the provisions of specialstatute have been attracted in the present case. Secondly, theoffence in question, for which the Appellant has been convicted,does not appear to exhibit his mental depravity. The aim of theSC/ST Act is to protect members of the downtrodden classesfrom atrocious acts of the upper strata of the society. It appearsthat although the Appellant may not belong to the same caste asthe Complainant, he too belongs to the relatively weaker/backwardsection of the society and is certainly not in any better economicor social position when compared to the victim. Despite therampant prevalence of segregation in Indian villages wherebymembers of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe communityare forced to restrict their quartes only to certain areas, it isseen that in the present case, the Appellant and the Complainantlived in adjoining houses. Therefore, keeping in mind the socio-economic status of the Appellant, the overriding objective of theSC/ST Act would not be overwhelmed if the present proceedingsare quashed. Thirdly, the incident occurred way back in the year1994. Nothing on record indicates that either before or after thepurported compromise, any untoward incident had transpiredbetween the parties. The State Counsel has also not brought anyother occurrence that would lead to believe that the Appellant iseither repeat offender or is unremorseful about what transpired.Fourthly, the Complainant has, on her own free will, without anycompulsion, entered into compromise and wishes to drop thepresent criminal proceedings against the accused. Fifthly, giventhe nature of the offence, it is immaterial that the trial against theAppellant had been concluded. Sixthly, the Appellant and theComplainant parties are residents of the same village and live invery close proximity to each other. There is no reason to doubt

Athat the parties themselves have voluntarily settled theirdifferences. Therefore, in order to avoid the revival of healedwounds, and to advance peace and harmony, it will be prudent toeffectuate the settlement. [Para 19][511-E-H; 512-A-H]

Hitesh Verma v. The State of Uttarakhand & Anr.B(2020) 10 SCC 710; Ram Lal & Anr. v. State of J&K(1999) 2 SCC 213: [1999] 1 SCR 230; Surendra NathMohanty & Anr. v. State of Orissa (1999) 5 SCC 238 :[1999] 2 SCR 1005; Bankat & Anr. v. State ofMaharastra (2005) 1 SCC 343 : [2004] 6 Suppl.SCR 406 – referred to.C

Case Law Reference

ECRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal AppealNo.1393 of 2011.

From the Judgment and Order dated 02.08.2010 of the High Courtof Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Criminal Appeal No.1684 of 1995.

Ms. Abha R. Sharma, Adv. for the Appellant.F

Praneet Pranav, Pashupathi Nath Razdan, Advs. for theRespondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SURYA KANT, J.

civil dispute over the ownership and possessory rights of pieceof land between the Appellant and his neighbour Prembai took an uglyturn when the Appellant allegedly not only threw brick on theComplainant but also made filthy and slur remarks on her caste, whichprompted the Complainant to lodge FIR No. 18/94 at Police Station O.E.

Panna under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and the ScheduledTribes (Prevention of Atrocities Act), 1989 (in short ‘SC/ST Act’) readwith Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short ‘I.P.C.’). TheAppellant and his co-accused were subsequently tried, which led to theAppellant’s conviction under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act andconsequential sentence of six months rigorous imprisonment and fine ofRs. 1000/-. The Appellant challenged his conviction and sentence beforethe High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur Bench but his appeal wasdismissed vide the impugned judgment dated 02.08.2010.

BRIEF FACTS:

2. Ramawatar (Appellant) and Prembai (Complainant), who areneighbours and live in adjoining houses, were entangled in propertydispute with respect to portion of land over which Prembai’s housewas built. On 25.06.1994, Ramawatar and his brother Katulal @ Kuddu(Co-accused) broke down wall to make door that opened into thehouse of Prembai. When this was resisted by her, quarrel ensuedbetween the parties and the Appellant threw brick at the Complainant.Thereafter, this incident was reported and complaint was lodged atPolice Station, Devendra Nagar on the same date itself, and an M.L.Cwas also performed. Since the nature of the injury was simple, and theoffence was found non-cognizable, the Police took no further steps. Onthe following day, i.e., 26.06.1994, when the Complainant was sitting infront of her residence, the Appellant and his brother appeared at thescene. They were visibly enraged by the fact that Prembai had lodgedan F.I.R. against them. They started abusing her with repeated referenceto her caste whilst also threatening her of dire consequences. After that,the Complainant and her husband Chotelal reported this incident beforethe Harijan Welfare Police Station, and the subject-F.I.R. under the SC/ST Act was lodged against the Accused.

3. The investigation commenced in light of the afore-stated facts.Upon collection of substantial evidence, Appellant and co-accused werecommitted to trial under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act read withSection 34 of the I.P.C.

4. The Trial Court noted that the Complainant belonged to the‘Prajapati’ community which is Scheduled Caste. It was also observedthat the parties had candidly admitted to pending property disputebetween them. The Trial Court further discerned that the prosecutionwitnesses had, by and large, supported the version of the Complainant

Aand had indubitably substantiated that Ramawatar and Kuddu useddeprecatory language upon the Complainant. It was found that theAppellant had made specific reference to the Complainant’s casteescorted by the intent to insult her. The actions of the Appellant & co-accused Kuddu were thus held to be in contravention of Section 3(1)(x)of the SC/ST Act read with Section 34 I.P.C. The Trial Court, therefore,Bconvicted both the accused persons for the said offences and sentencedeach of them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 6 months.5. Discontented with their conviction, the accused preferred anappeal before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur Bench.However, during the pendency of the proceedings, co-accused KudduCpassed away, and the appeal only survived qua the present Appellant.His primary contention before the High Court was that the abuses, ifany, were not meant to demean the Complainant on account of her beinga member of the Scheduled Caste community. Instead, the incidentoccurred on account of property dispute between the parties. It wasDthus submitted that the alleged incident could not attract the provisionsof the SC/ST Act. However, after re-appraising the evidence on record,the High Court disagreed with the Appellant’s contention and held thatthere was sufficient material to establish that the Complainant being amember of the Scheduled Caste community was humiliated by theAppellant. Thus, concurring with the findings of the Trial Court, the HighECourt maintained the order of conviction and sentence passed againstthe Appellant.

6. Aggrieved, the Appellant has approached this Court.

CONTENTIONS:F

7. When the instant appeal came up for hearing, what promptedthis Court to issue notice was that the matter had been settled betweenthe parties, and the Complainant had filed an application for compromise.Reiterating the same plea, learned Counsel for the Appellant canvassedbefore us that the parties are residents of the same village and there isGno existing enmity between them. It was submitted that the parties wishedto settle their dispute so that they may continue to have cordial relations.He drew our attention to decision of this Court in Hitesh Verma v.The State of Uttarakhand & Anr[1], wherein, it was held that propertydispute between vulnerable section of the society and person of

upper caste would not attract an offence under the SC/ST Act, unlessthe allegations are on account of the victim being Scheduled Caste.Learned Counsel for the Appellant thus prayed for invocation of thisCourt’s powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to quash the instantcriminal proceedings. The Appellant’s stand and the application forcompromise were fully supported by the learned Counsel for theComplainant.

8. Per Contra, learned Counsel for the Respondent State, withoutcontroverting the factum of compromise, vehemently opposed such arecourse. It was contended that there was concurrent finding ofconviction, and no substantial question of law was involved in the presentappeal. Referring to the decisions of this Court in the case of Ram Lal& Anr v. State of J&K[2], Surendra Nath Mohanty & Anr v. State ofOrissa[3] and Bankat & Anr v. State of Maharastra[4], learned StateCounsel submitted that the purported settlement between the parties isinconsequential as the offence in question is not compoundable in termsof Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short‘Cr.P.C’). It was thus argued that the present case did not warrant anyinterference by this Court.

ANALYSIS:

9. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties at some length,we are of the opinion that two questions fall for our consideration in thepresent appeal. First, whether the jurisdiction of this Court under Article142 of the Constitution can be invoked for quashing of criminal proceedingsarising out of ‘non-compoundable offence? If yes, then whether thepower to quash proceedings can be extended to offences arising out ofspecial statutes such as the SC/ST Act?

10. So far as the first question is concerned, it would be ad rem tooutrightly refer to the recent decision of this Court in the case ofRamgopal & Anr v. The State of Madhya Pradesh[5], wherein, two-Judge Bench of this Court consisting of two of us (N.V. Ramana, CJI &Surya Kant, J) was confronted with an identical question. Answering inthe affirmative, it has been clarified that the jurisdiction of Court underSection 320 Cr.P.C cannot be construed as proscription against the

2 (1999) 2 SCC 2133 (1999) 5 SCC 238

4 (2005) 1 SCC 343

5 Criminal Appeal No. 1489 of 2012

Ainvocation of inherent powers vested in this Court under Article 142 ofthe Constitution nor on the powers of the High Courts under Section 482Cr.P.C. It was further held that the touchstone for exercising the extra-ordinary powers under Article 142 or Section 482 Cr.P.C., would be todo complete justice. Therefore, this Court or the High Court, as the casemay be, after having given due regard to the nature of the offence andBthe fact that the victim/complainant has willingly entered into settlement/compromise, can quash proceedings in exercise of their respectiveconstitutional/inherent powers.

11. The Court in Ramgopal (Supra) further postulated that criminalproceedings involving non-heinous offences or offences which areCpredominantly of private nature, could be set aside at any stage of theproceedings, including at the appellate level. The Court, however, beingconscious of the fact that unscrupulous offenders may attempt to escapetheir criminal liabilities by securing compromise through brute force,threats, bribes, or other such unethical and illegal means, cautioned that

Din cases where settlement is struck post-conviction, the Courts should,inter-alia, carefully examine the fashion in which the compromise hasbeen arrived at, as well as, the conduct of the accused before and afterthe incident in question. While concluding, the Court also formulatedcertain guidelines and held:

E“19… Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wideamplitude ought to be exercised carefully in the context of quashingcriminal proceedings, bearing in mind: (i) Nature and effect ofthe offence on the conscious of the society; (ii) Seriousness ofthe injury, if any; (iii) Voluntary nature of compromise betweenthe accused and the victim; & (iv) Conduct of the accusedFpersons, prior to and after the occurrence of the purportedoffence and/or other relevant considerations.”

[Emphasis Applied]

12. In view of the settled proposition of law, we affirm the decisionGof this Court in Ramgopal (Supra) and re-iterate that the powers ofthis Court under Article 142 can be invoked to quash criminal proceedingon the basis of voluntary co\\mpromise between the complainant/victimand the accused.

13. We, however, put further caveat that the powers underArticle 142 or under Section 482 Cr.P.C., are exercisable in post-H

conviction matters only where an appeal is pending before one or theother Judicial forum. This is on the premise that an order of convictiondoes not attain finality till the accused has exhausted his/her legal remediesand the finality is sub-judice before an appellate court. The pendency oflegal proceedings, be that may before the final Court, is sine-qua-nonto involve the superior court’s plenary powers to do complete justice.Conversely, where settlement has ensued post the attainment of alllegal remedies, the annulment of proceedings on the basis of acompromise would be impermissible. Such an embargo is necessitatedto prevent the accused from gaining an indefinite leverage, for such asettlement/compromise will always be loaded with lurking suspicion aboutits bona fide. We have already clarified that the purpose of these extra-ordinary powers is not to incentivise any hollow-hearted agreementsbetween the accused and the victim but to do complete justice by effectinggenuine settlement(s).14. With respect to the second question before us, it must benoted that even though the powers of this Court under Article 142 arewide and far-reaching, the same cannot be exercised in vacuum. Trueit is that ordinary statutes or any restrictions contained therein, cannotbe constructed as limitation on the Court’s power to do “completejustice”. However, this is not to say that this Court can altogether ignorethe statutory provisions or other express prohibitions in law. In fact, theCourt is obligated to take note of the relevant laws and will have toregulate the use of its power and discretion accordingly. The ConstitutionBench decision in the case of Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union ofIndia & Anr[6 ]has eloquently clarified this point as follows:

“48. The Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article142 has the power to make such order as is necessary for doingcomplete justice “between the parties in any cause or matterpending before it”. The very nature of the power must lead theCourt to set limits for itself within which to exercise those powersand ordinarily it cannot disregard statutory provision governinga subject, except perhaps to balance the equities between theconflicting claims of the litigating parties by “ironing out thecreases” in cause or matter before it. Indeed this Court is nota court of restricted jurisdiction of only dispute-settling. It is wellrecognised and established that this Court has always been law-

ABC

510SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Amaker and its role travels beyond merely dispute-settling. It is a“problem-solver in the nebulous areas” (see K. Veeraswami v.Union of India [(1991) 3 SCC 655 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 734] but thesubstantive statutory provisions dealing with the subject-matterof given case cannot be altogether ignored by this Court, whilemaking an order under Article 142. Indeed, these constitutionalBpowers cannot, in any way, be controlled by any statutoryprovisions but at the same time these powers are not meant to beexercised when their exercise may come directly in conflict withwhat has been expressly provided for in statute dealing expresslywith the subject.”

15. Ordinarily, when dealing with offences arising out of specialstatutes such as the SC/ST Act, the Court will be extremely circumspectin its approach. The SC/ST Act has been specifically enacted to deteracts of indignity, humiliation and harassment against members ofScheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The Act is also recognitionDof the depressing reality that despite undertaking several measures, theScheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes continue to be subjected to variousatrocities at the hands of upper-castes. The Courts have to be mindfulof the fact that the Act has been enacted keeping in view the expressconstitutional safeguards enumerated in Articles 15, 17 and 21 of theEConstitution, with twin-fold objective of protecting the members ofthese vulnerable communities as well as to provide relief and rehabilitationto the victims of caste-based atrocities.

16. On the other hand, where it appears to the Court that theoffence in question, although covered under the SC/ST Act, is primarilyFprivate or civil in nature, or where the alleged offence has not beencommitted on account of the caste of the victim, or where the continuationof the legal proceedings would be an abuse of the process of law, theCourt can exercise its powers to quash the proceedings. On similar lines,when considering prayer for quashing on the basis of compromise/settlement, if the Court is satisfied that the underlying objective of theGAct would not be contravened or diminished even if the felony in questiongoes unpunished, the mere fact that the offence is covered under a‘special statute’ would not refrain this Court or the High Court, fromexercising their respective powers under Article 142 of the Constitutionor Section 482 Cr.P.C.H17. Adverting to the case in hand, we note that the present Appellanthas been charged and convicted under the unamended Section 3(1)(x)of the SC/ST Act[7], which was as follows:

“3. Punishments for offences of atrocities- (1) Whoever, notbeing member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe,—

xxxx

(x) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate amember of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe in any placewithin public view;

xxxx”

18. We may hasten to add that in cases such as the present, theCourts ought to be even more vigilant to ensure that the complainant-victim has entered into the compromise on the volition of his/her freewill and not on account of any duress. It cannot be understated thatsince members of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe belong tothe weaker sections of our country, they are more prone to acts ofcoercion, and therefore ought to be accorded higher level of protection.If the Courts find even hint of compulsion or force, no relief can begiven to the accused party. What factors the Courts should consider,would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.

19. Having considered the peculiar facts and circumstances ofthe present case in light of the afore-stated principles, as well as havingmeditated on the application for compromise, we are inclined to invokethe powers under Article 142 and quash the instant Criminal proceedingswith the sole objective of doing complete justice between the partiesbefore us. We say so for the reasons that:

Firstly, the very purpose behind Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST isto deter caste-based insults and intimidations when they are used withthe intention of demeaning victim on account of he/she belonging tothe Scheduled Caste/ Scheduled Tribe community. In the present case,the record manifests that there was an undeniable pre-existing civil disputebetween the parties. The case of the Appellant, from the very beginning,has been that the alleged abuses were uttered solely on account offrustration and anger over the pending dispute. Thus, the genesis of thedeprecated incident was the afore-stated civil/property dispute.

7 Section 3(1)(x) of the Act stands substituted by Act No. 1 of 2016 w.e.f. 26.01.2016.

AConsidering this aspect, we are of the opinion that it would not be incorrectto categorise the occurrence as one being overarchingly private in nature,having only subtle undertones of criminality, even though the provisionsof special statute have been attracted in the present case.

Secondly, the offence in question, for which the Appellant hasBbeen convicted, does not appear to exhibit his mental depravity. The aimof the SC/ST Act is to protect members of the downtrodden classesfrom atrocious acts of the upper strata of the society. It appears to usthat although the Appellant may not belong to the same caste as theComplainant, he too belongs to the relatively weaker/backward sectionof the society and is certainly not in any better economic or social positionCwhen compared to the victim. Despite the rampant prevalence ofsegregation in Indian villages whereby members of the Scheduled Casteand Scheduled Tribe community are forced to restrict their quartes onlyto certain areas, it is seen that in the present case, the Appellant and theComplainant lived in adjoining houses. Therefore, keeping in mind theDsocio-economic status of the Appellant, we are of the opinion that theoverriding objective of the SC/ST Act would not be overwhelmed if thepresent proceedings are quashed.

Thirdly, the incident occurred way back in the year 1994. Nothingon record indicates that either before or after the purported compromise,Eany untoward incident had transpired between the parties. The StateCounsel has also not brought to our attention any other occurrence thatwould lead us to believe that the Appellant is either repeat offender oris unremorseful about what transpired.

Fourthly, the Complainant has, on her own free will, without anyFcompulsion, entered into compromise and wishes to drop the presentcriminal proceedings against the accused.

Fifthly, given the nature of the offence, it is immaterial that thetrial against the Appellant had been concluded.

GSixthly, the Appellant and the Complainant parties are residentsof the same village and live in very close proximity to each other. Wehave no reason to doubt that the parties themselves have voluntarilysettled their differences. Therefore, in order to avoid the revival of healedwounds, and to advance peace and harmony, it will be prudent toeffectuate the present settlement.H

CONCLUSION:

20. Consequently, and for the aforementioned reasons, we find itappropriate to invoke our powers under Article 142 of the Constitutionand quash the criminal proceedings to do complete justice between theparties. As sequel thereto, judgment and orders passed by the TrialCourt and the High Court are set aside. Bail bonds, if any, are discharged.The appeal is allowed in above terms.

Devika Gujral

Appeal allowed.