SRI GULAM MUSTAFA versus THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR.

[2023] 5 S.C.R. 354

[2023] 5 S.C.R.

SRI GULAM MUSTAFA

THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR.

(Criminal Appeal No. 1452 of 2023)

MAY 10, 2023

[DINESH MAHESHWARI ANDAHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, JJ.]

Administration of Justice –Abuse of Process of Law – CivilCdispute relating to land given the colour of criminality – Held: Thereis huge unexplained delay of over 60 years in initiating disputewith regard to the ownership of the land in question – Criminalcase was lodged only after failure to obtain relief in the civil suitscoupled with denial of interim relief to the respondent no.2/herfamily members – Thus, criminal proceedings were resorted to withDulterior motives, for oblique reasons and vengeance – Further, evenif the allegations are taken on their face value, no offence is madeout under the SC/ST Act against the appellant – The complaint andFIR are frivolous, vexatious and oppressive – High Court fell inerror in not invoking its wholesome power u/s.482, CrPC to quashEthe FIR – Impugned judgment set aside – FIR and any proceedingsemanating therefrom, relating to the appellant are quashed – Codeof Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Scheduled Castes andScheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – Penal Code,1860.

FCode of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Quashing ofFIR – Scope of – Discussed.

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Quashing ofFIR under special statute – Held: The mere fact that the offence iscovered under ‘special statute’ would not inhibit Supreme CourtGor the High Court from exercising their respective powers u/Article142 or s.482, CrPC – Constitution of India – Article 142 – ScheduledCastes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.

Administration of Justice – Administration of Criminal Justice– FIR – Invocation of provision of stringent statutes – Duty of officers– Held: Officers who institute an FIR, based on any complaint, areH

duty bound to be vigilant before invoking any provision of verystringent statute, like the SC/ST Act, which imposes serious penalconsequences on the concerned accused – Scheduled Castes andScheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 –Criminal Law.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

Held: 1.1 The mere fact that the offense is covered undera ‘special statute’ would not inhibit this Court or the High Courtfrom exercising their respective powers under Article 142 of theConstitution or Section 482 of the Code. [Para 34][369-C-D]

1.2 The FIR need not be detailed one, as it is only toinitiate the investigative process and the police should ordinarilybe allowed to investigate. This is the general rule, but not fetteron this Court or the High Court in an appropriate case. [Para35][370-D-E]

Superintendent of Police CBI v Tapan Kumar Singh,(2003) 6 SCC 175 : [2003] 3 SCR 485; State of UttarPradesh v Naresh, (2011) 4 SCC 324 : [2011] 4 SCR1176 – relied on.

1.3 This Court has been consistent in interfering in suchmatters where purely civil disputes, more often than not, relatingto land and/or money are given the colour of criminality, only forthe purposes of exerting extra-judicial pressure on the partyconcerned, which is nothing but abuse of the process of the court.In the present case, there is huge and unexplained delay ofover 60 years in initiating dispute with regard to the ownershipof the land in question, and the criminal case has been lodgedonly after failure to obtain relief in the civil suits, coupled withdenial of relief in the interim therein to the respondent no.2/herfamily members. It is evident that resort was now being had tocriminal proceedings which, in the considered opinion of thisCourt, is with ulterior motives, for oblique reasons and is clearcase of vengeance. Even if the allegations are taken to be trueon their face value, it is not discernible that any offence can besaid to have been made out under the SC/ST Act against theappellant. The complaint and FIR are frivolous, vexatious andoppressive. [Paras 36, 37][370-E-H]

1.4 The officers, who institute an FIR, based on anycomplaint, are duty bound to be vigilant before invoking anyprovision of very stringent statute, like the SC/ST Act, whichimposes serious penal consequences on the concerned accused.The officer has to be satisfied that the provisions he seeks toinvoke prima facie apply to the case at hand. [Para 38][371-A-B]

1.5 The High Court fell in error in not invoking itswholesome power under Section 482 of the Code to quash theFIR. The Impugned Judgment, being untenable in law, is set aside.The FIR, as also any proceedings emanating therefrom, insofaras they relate to the appellant, are quashed and set aside. [ParaC39][371-C-D]

State of Haryana v Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335: [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259; S W Palanitkar v State ofBihar (2002) 1 SCC 24; State of Karnataka v MDevendrappa (2002) 3 SCC 89 : [2002] 1 SCR 275;Uma Shankar Gopalika v State of Bihar (2005) 10 SCC336; Parbatbhai Aahir v State of Gujarat (2017) 9 SCC641 : [2017] 10 SCR 12; State of Telangana v HabibAbdullah Jeelani (2017) 2 SCC 779 : [2017] 1 SCR141; Vinod Natesan v State of Kerala (2019) 2 SCC401; Kamal Shivaji Pokarnekar v State of Maharashtra(2019) 14 SCC 350; Mahendra K v State of Karnataka2021 SCC OnLine SC 1021; Arnab ManoranjanGoswami v State of Maharashtra (2021) 2 SCC 427;Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v State ofMaharashtra 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315; Ramawatarv State of Madhya Pradesh 2021 SCC OnLine SC 966– relied on.

Govind Prasad Kejriwal v State of Bihar (2020) 16 SCC714; Commissioner of Police v Devender Anand 2019SCC OnLine SC 966; Binod Kumar v State of Bihar(2014) 10 SCC 663 : [2014] 11 SCR 85; Indian OilCorporation v NEPC India Ltd. (2006) 6 SCC 736 :[2006] 3 Suppl. SCR 704; Sagar Suri v State of UttarPradesh (2000) 2 SCC 636 : [2000] 1 SCR 417; Stateof Madhya Pradesh v Surendra Kori (2012) 10 SCC

155 : [2012] 8 SCR 858; Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patelv State of Gujarat (2018) 3 SCC 104 : [2018] 1 SCR62; Satvinder Kaur v State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)(1999) 8 SCC 728 : [1999] 3 Suppl. SCR 348; PChidambaram v Directorate of Enforcement (2019) 9SCC 24 : [2019] 12 SCR 172; Skoda Auto VolkswagenIndia Private Limited v State of Uttar Pradesh (2021) 5SCC 795; Union of India v Prakash P Hinduja (2003)6 SCC 195 : [2003] 1 Suppl. SCR 307 – referred to.

Case Law Reference

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.1452 of 2023.

From the Judgment and Order dated 23.02.2021 of the High Courtof Karnataka at Bengaluru in CRLP No. 3788 of 2019.

Devadatt Kamat, Sr. Adv., Nizam Pasha, Lzafeer Ahmad B. F.,Sidhharth Kaushik, Shivendra Pandey, Rajesh Inamdar, Anubhav Kumar,Ismail Zabiulla, Advs. for the Appellant.

AShubhranshu Padhi, Vishal Banshal, Niroop Sukrithy, Jai Nirupam,Mahesh Thakur, Ms. Shivani, Mrs. Geetanjali Bedi, Mrs. Vipasha Singh,Advs. for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.B

Heard learned counsel for the appellant, respondent no.1 andrespondent no.2.

2. Leave granted.

3. The present criminal appeal is directed against the FinalCJudgment and Order dated 23.02.2021 (hereinafter referred to as the“Impugned Judgment”) rendered by the High Court of Karnataka(hereinafter referred to as the “High Court”) at Bengaluru, whereby theHigh Court was pleased to reject Criminal Petition No. 3788 of 2019preferred by the appellant.DFACTUAL PRISM:

4. The Appellant is the Managing Director of GM Infinite Dwelling(India) Private Limited (hereinafter referred to as “GMID”). Thecompany is said to be engaged in developing residential properties. Thesaid company and the owners (heirs of one Mr A. Hafeez Khan) of landEbearing Survey Number 83 in Jodi Mallasandra Village, DistrictBengaluru entered into Joint Development Agreement (hereinafterreferred to as the “JDA”) on 17.08.2009. In the year 2017, the apartmentproject, as contemplated under the JDA, was completed and sale deedswere executed in favour of the allottees.

F5. The original owners of the land claimed title on the basis ofpossessing the sale deed with regard to the said land; order of the SpecialDeputy Commissioner, Inams Abolition, Bangalore in Case No. 86/1959-60 dated 09.07.1961; Revenue records recording the property mutatedin the names of the heirs of Mr. A. Hafeez Khan and given SurveyNumbers 83/1 and 83/2 [(old Survey Number 8) new Survey NumberG83]. Pursuant to the JDA, the land-owners got the land-use changedfrom agriculture to non-agriculture and after getting the necessary No-Objection Certificate from various departments involved, obtained thesanctioned map and Building License from the Bruhat BengaluruMahanagar Palike (hereinafter referred to as the “BBMP”), beforeHconstruction commenced.

6. It transpires that one Venkatesh, son of Late Bylappa, was theowner of old Survey Number 83 and his property had been assignednew Survey Numbers 80/1 and 80/3, and due to such change, with thenew survey numbers with regard to the land in question being SurveyNumber 83, the said Venkatesh claimed title over land under the newSurvey Number 83. This resulted in prolonged civil litigation whichincluded an application before the Special Tehsildar; appeal before theAssistant Commissioner, Bangalore, North Sub-Division, and; Appealbefore the Special Deputy Commissioner – all of which went againstVenkatesh.

7. But that is not all. There were also two suits – one filed by thelegitimate land-owners, which was suit for injunction, and one (whichwe have no hesitation in terming so) frivolous suit filed by Venkatesh.Since Venkatesh’s suit did not yield any relief, he, along with others,approached the High Court with an appeal, which was also dismissed.In addition to this, Venkatesh also made an application before theAdditional Director, Town Planning, BBMP and got the sanctioned plancancelled. GMID impugned the cancellation before the High Court byway of writ petition, which was disposed of directing GMID and theowners to approach the BBMP’s Appeal Committee. Upon so doing,BBMP’s Appeal Committee set aside the order of the Commissionerand restored the sanctioned plan.8. The construction commenced and after GMID having enteredinto sale agreement(s) with prospective purchasers of the apartments,Venkatesh initiated criminal proceedings against the appellants and othersand through his proxies, one of whom, namely, Parvathy Reddy hadeven been impleaded in the civil suit filed by Venkatesh. Another civilsuit being O.S. No. 8163/2016 has also been filed against the land-ownersand the builders by other person(s), which, as on date, is still pending.While these civil litigations were being defended by GMID and the originallandlords in various courts, criminal complaint was lodged by the motherof the plaintiff in O.S. No. 8163/2016, under Sections 120B, 406, 419,468, 471, 420, 448, 427 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code,1860 (hereinafter referred to as the “IPC”). The same metamorphosedinto First Information Report in Crime No. 317/2017 at Bagalgunte PoliceStation, Bangalore City (hereinafter referred to as the “FIR”) underSection 3(1)(15) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the “SC/

AST Act”) and Sections 427, 420, 419, 406, 471, 468, 448 and 120B of theIPC. The Managing Director of GMID, namely Gulam Mustafa, theappellant before us is arrayed as Accused No. 18 in the FIR.

9. Insofar as the development on the land is concerned, learnedcounsel for the appellant has stated that in 2017, the construction of theBapartments was completed, sale deeds executed in favour of therespective allottees, and these allottees are residing in their apartmentsthereafter.

10. The appellant moved petition under Section 482 of the Codeof Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the “Code”) onC28.05.2019 before the High Court for quashing the FIR. The said petitionwas numbered Criminal Petition No. 3788 of 2019, and the High Court,by order dated 07.08.2019, while issuing notice, granted ad-interimdirection staying further proceedings in the FIR as far as the appellantwas concerned. However, Criminal Petition No. 3788 of 2019 wasultimately dismissed on 23.02.2021, leading to the institution of the instantDappeal.

SUBMISSIONS BY THE APPELLANT:

11. Learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that firstly,the matter is purely civil in nature as it raises questions relating to title ofthe land on which GMID had entered into JDA and constructedEapartments after following the due procedure in law.

12. It was submitted that not one but multiple authorities, includingrevenue authorities, the BBMP, etc. had given requisite permission/s forconstruction. Moreover, it was submitted that initial civil litigation wasalso decided in favour of the original land-owners, with whom GMIDFhad signed the JDA.

13. The complaint resulting into the FIR, submitted learned counsel,was at the behest of Venkatesh, who, mischievously, taking advantageof the similarity in the old survey number of his land with the new surveynumber of the land involved herein, had blatantly abused the process ofGthe court. It was submitted that even when the initial written complaintwas filed before the police, GMID was arrayed as Accused No. 19, butin the consequent FIR, the appellant was made party thereto, by naminghim as the Accused No.18.

14. It was submitted that the FIR is complete abuse of processHas it has been filed by family member of the person, who was

unsuccessful in various proceedings against the original land-owners andthe builder (GMID), where they could not succeed and that is the reasonwhy Venkatesh had put up his illiterate mother to file false and frivolouscomplaint levelling false allegations. It was submitted that the issue oftitle of the property has attained finality in terms of the decree passed bythe Civil Court and no appeal has been filed against the same. It wassubmitted that even the allegations to bring in the SC/ST Act weredeliberate, and with malafide intention.15. Learned counsel submitted that this Court has repeatedlydeprecated the practice of filing false criminal cases in order to applypressure and settle civil disputes. By way of illustration, he relied uponGovind Prasad Kejriwal v State of Bihar, (2020) 16 SCC714;Commissioner of Police v Devender Anand, 2019 SCC OnLineSC 966; Binod Kumarv State of Bihar, (2014) 10 SCC 663; IndianOil Corporationv NEPC India Ltd., (2006) 6 SCC 736 and SagarSurivState of Uttar Pradesh, (2000) 2 SCC 636.

16. It was submitted that till date chargesheet has not been filed.It was further submitted that GMID had developed residential apartmentcomplexes of more than 400 units on the self-same land, whereon thecomplainant’s family unsuccessfully attempted to claim title on multipleoccasions, and the FIR is nothing but vexatious proceeding employedas tool by the complainant to coerce the appellant to agree to unjustifiedattempts. It was canvassed that in 2010, the relatives of the complainanthad instituted civil suit seeking declaration of the title of the suit property,which was dismissed in 2016. Subsequently, the sons of the complainantinstituted fresh suit in 2016 and also sought an order to, inter alia,restrain the appellant from entering upon the land in question. The saidsuit, it is stated, is pending without any interim order in operation.

17. Learned counsel also drew the attention of the Court to thefact that the complainant’s relatives initially tried to interfere with thesuit property in 2006 due to which the original land-owners had initiateda civil suit in 2008, which was, in fact, decreed against the complainant’sfamily members.

18. It was also submitted that the person(s), with whom theappellant had inked the JDA, had purchased the subject-property in 1954-1955 and thereafter, they got occupancy rights of the land on 09.07.1961,and only in 2017, the present criminal dispute had been engineered bythe complainant and/or her family members, noted hereinabove.

362SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ASUBMISSIONS OF RESPONDENT NO. 2/COMPLAINANT:

19. Learned counsel for the complainant/respondent no. 2 submittedthat the appeal is misconceived as the police was in the midst of investigationwhich should be allowed to be completed. It was submitted that thecomplainant belongs to the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes categoryBand is protected thereunder. Learned counsel supported the invocation ofthe provisions of the SC/ST Act in the FIR. It was submitted that theadditional documents, sought to be made part of the present record, werenot part of the pleadings before the High Court and thus, may not belooked into. It was contended that it would amount to introduction of newfact(s) in this case. It was contended that Section 482 of the Code requiresCthe court only to see, whether from the complaint, any cognizable offenceis made out, which in the present case is made out.

20. It was submitted that as the specific allegations pertain tocheating, criminal conspiracy and trespass, being cognizable offencesunder the IPC, and the same relating to the property belonging to theDScheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes community would attract provisionsof the SC/ST Act. It was reiterated that the property in question belongsto the respondent no. 2 and her family members, and any constructionraised on the subject-land is by creating forged documents.

21. It was then contended that the Court is to be highly circumspectEin interfering with investigation and quashing of FIRs. In support of hiscontentions, learned counsel relied upon the following judgments, andthe paragraphs indicated alongside:

i.State of Madhya Pradesh v Surendra Kori, (2012) 10SCC 155 @ Paras 14 and 16.

ii.Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patel v State of Gujarat, (2018)3 SCC 104 @ Paras 30-31

iii.Satvinder Kaur v State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (1999)8 SCC 728@ Para 16

Giv.P Chidambaram v Directorate of Enforcement, (2019)9 SCC 24 @ Paras 61, 64-67

v.Skoda Auto Volkswagen India Private Limited v Stateof Uttar Pradesh, (2021) 5 SCC 795 @ Para 41

vi.Union of India v Prakash P Hinduja, (2003) 6 SCCH195@ Para 20

22. Further, advancing that the FIR was not required to be anencyclopaedia, which must disclose all facts and details of the offence(s)alleged or complained of, learned counsel relied upon Superintendentof Police, CBI v Tapan Kumar Singh, (2003) 6 SCC 175(at Para20) and State of Uttar Pradesh v Naresh, (2011) 4 SCC 324 (at Para32).

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NO.1/THESTATE:

23. Learned counsel for the State submitted that the matter involvesdisputed questions of fact which this Court would not go into. It was thesubmission that the case be left to be investigated into by the police.Further, it was submitted that Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patel (supra)has held that it is the duty of the Investigating Officer to probe the crime,and that the High Court is not to act as an Investigating Officer.

ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:

24. Having considered the matter, this Court finds that case forinterference is made out. The basic facts to be noticed are: (a) that theland-owners with whom GMID had entered into the JDA, had purchasedthe land in 1954-1955, and; (b) the occupancy rights were also createdin the original land-owners’ favour on 09.07.1961. From then onwards,no dispute was raised by any person before any authority and only afterthe GMID entered into the JDA with the original land-owners in theyear 2009, obtained all clearances from the authorities in their favour,started the construction work and built apartments numbering more than400, sold them to the buyers/allottees in the year 2017, did the presentdispute arise. This itself indicates lack of bonafide. We have musedas to why the complainant and her family members, if the land wastheirs, would sit by and watch on as fence-sitters for long period oftime.

25. Moreover, when one civil litigation had attained finality withno relief granted to the relatives of the complainant, another civil suitwas filed in the year 2016 and therein as well, when no interim ordercould be secured by the complainant/her family members, the presentcomplaint has been registered, resulting in the FIR. We are constrainedto state that the malafide appears writ large from the aforenoted sequenceof events.

26. Although we are not for verbosity in our judgments, slightlydetailed survey of the judicial precedents is in order. In State of Haryanav Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, this Court held:

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the variousrelevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and ofthe principles of law enunciated by this Court in series ofdecisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary powerunder Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above,we give the following categories of cases by way of illustrationwherein such power could be exercised either to preventabuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure theends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down anyprecise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised andinflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give anexhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such powershould be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first informationreport or the complaint, even if they are taken at their facevalue and accepted in their entirety do not prima facieconstitute any offence or make out case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information reportand other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do notdisclose cognizable offence, justifying an investigation bypolice officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except underan order of Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2)of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIRor complaint and the evidence collected in support of thesame do not disclose the commission of any offence and makeout case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute acognizable offence but constitute only non-cognizableoffence, no investigation is permitted by police officer withoutan order of Magistrate as contemplated under Section155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaintare so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of whichno prudent person can ever reach just conclusion that thereis sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any ofthe provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under whicha criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution andcontinuance of the proceedings and/or where there is aspecific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providingefficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where criminal proceeding is manifestly attended withmala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously institutedwith an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accusedand with view to spite him due to private and personalgrudge.

103. We also give note of caution to the effect that thepower of quashing criminal proceeding should be exercisedvery sparingly and with circumspection and that too in therarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified inembarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuinenessor otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or thecomplaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers donot confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to actaccording to its whim or caprice.”

27. This Court, in S W Palanitkar v State of Bihar, (2002) 1SCC 24, held:

“… whereas while exercising power under Section 482CrPC the High Court has to look at the object and purposefor which such power is conferred on it under the saidprovision. Exercise of inherent power is available to the HighCourt to give effect to any order under CrPC, or to preventabuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure theends of justice. This being the position, exercise of powerunder Section 482 CrPC should be consistent with the scopeand ambit of the same in the light of the decisionsaforementioned. In appropriate cases, to prevent judicial

process from being an instrument of oppression or harassmentin the hands of frustrated or vindictive litigants, exercise ofinherent power is not only desirable but necessary also, sothat the judicial forum of court may not be allowed to beutilized for any oblique motive. When person approachesthe High Court under Section 482 CrPC to quash the veryissue of process, the High Court on the facts andcircumstances of case has to exercise the powers withcircumspection as stated above to really serve the purposeand object for which they are conferred.”

(emphasis supplied)

28. In State of Karnataka v M Devendrappa, (2002) 3 SCC89, it was decided:

“6. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in acase of this nature is the exception and not the rule. Thesection does not confer any new powers on the High Court.It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessedbefore the enactment of the Code. It envisages threecircumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may beexercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code,(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) tootherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nordesirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would governthe exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactmentdealing with procedure can provide for all cases that maypossibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apartfrom express provisions of law which are necessary for properdischarge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law.That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section whichmerely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the HighCourts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in theabsence of any express provision, as inherent in theirconstitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the rightand to undo wrong in course of administration of justiceon the principle quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concederevidetur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest (when the lawgives person anything it gives him that without which itcannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the

court does not function as court of appeal or revision.Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to beexercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only whensuch exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down inthe section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to doreal and substantial justice for the administration of whichalone courts exist. Authority of the court exists foradvancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abusethat authority so as to produce injustice, the court has powerto prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the courtto allow any action which would result in injustice and preventpromotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court wouldbe justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court orquashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the endsof justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, thecourt may examine the question of fact. When complaint issought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into thematerials to assess what the complainant has alleged andwhether any offence is made out even if the allegations are”accepted in toto.

(emphasis supplied)

29. In Uma Shankar Gopalika v State of Bihar, (2005) 10SCC 336, at Para 7 thereof, it was held that when the complaint fails todisclose any criminal offence, the proceeding is liable to be quashedunder Section 482 of the Code:

“In our view petition of complaint does not disclose anycriminal offence at all much less any offenceeither underSection 420 or Section 120-B IPC and the present case is acase of purely civil dispute between the parties for whichremedy lies before civil court by filing properly constitutedsuit. In our opinion, in view of these facts allowing the policeinvestigation to continue would amount to an abuse of theprocess of court and to prevent the same it was just andexpedient for the High Court to quash the same by exercisingthe powers under Section 482 Code which it has erroneously”refused.

(emphasis supplied)

A30. The law on the subject was also examined in ParbatbhaiAahir v State of Gujarat, (2017) 9 SCC 641. In Habib AbdullahJeelani, (2017) 2 SCC 779, it was opined:

“inherent power in matter of quashment of FIR has to beexercised sparingly and with caution and when and only whenBsuch exercise is justified by the test specifically laid down inthe provision itself There is no denial of the fact that the powerunder Section 482 CrPC is very wide but it needs no specialemphasis to state that conferment of wide power requires theCourt to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more”diligent duty on the Court.C

(emphasis supplied)

31. In Vinod Natesan v State of Kerala, (2019) 2 SCC 401,this Court took the position outlined hereunder:

“11. … Even otherwise, as observed hereinabove, we areDmore than satisfied that there was no criminality on part ofthe accused and civil dispute is tried to be converted into acriminal dispute. Thus to continue the criminal proceedingsagainst the accused would be an abuse of the process of law.Therefore, the High Court has rightly exercised the powersunder Section 482 CrPC and has rightly quashed the criminalEproceedings. In view of the aforesaid and for the reasonsstated above, the present appeal fails and deserves to be”dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.

(emphasis supplied)

F32. The legal position was also considered in Kamal ShivajiPokarnekar v State of Maharashtra, (2019) 14 SCC 350. InMahendra K v State of Karnataka, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1021,this Court stated:

“23. … the High Court while exercising its power underSection 482 of the CrPC to quash the FIR instituted againstGthe second respondent-accused should have applied thefollowing two tests : i) whether the allegations made in thecomplaint, prima facie constitute an offence; and ii) whetherthe allegations are so improbable that prudent man wouldnot arrive at the conclusion that there is sufficient ground toHproceed with the complaint.”

33. We are equally mindful of Arnab Manoranjan Goswami vState of Maharashtra, (2021) 2 SCC 427, where at Paragraph 68, itwas stated that “… The other end of the spectrum is equally important:the recognition by Section 482 of the power inhering in the HighCourt to prevent the abuse of process or to secure the ends of justiceis valuable safeguard for protecting liberty.” We are at one withthis comment. detailed exposition of the law is also forthcoming inNeeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v State of Maharashtra, 2021SCC OnLine SC 315, which we have factored into, while adjudicatingthe instant lis.

34. Insofar and inasmuch as interference in cases involving theSC/ST Act is concerned, we may only point out that 3-Judge Bench ofthis Court, in Ramawatar v State of Madhya Pradesh, 2021 SCCOnLine SC 966, has held that the mere fact that the offence is coveredunder ‘special statute’ would not inhibit this Court or the High Courtfrom exercising their respective powers under Article 142 of theConstitution or Section 482 of the Code, in the terms below:

“15. Ordinarily, when dealing with offences arising outof special statutes such as the SC/ST Act, the Court will beextremely circumspect in its approach. The SC/ST Act has beenspecifically enacted to deter acts of indignity, humiliation andharassment against members of Scheduled Castes andScheduled Tribes. The SC/ST Act is also recognition of thedepressing reality that despite undertaking several measures,the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes continue to besubjected to various atrocities at the hands of upper-castes.The Courts have to be mindful of the fact that the SC/ST Acthas been enacted keeping in view the express constitutionalsafeguards enumerated in Articles 15, 17 and 21 of theConstitution, with twin-fold objective of protecting themembers of these vulnerable communities as well as to providerelief and rehabilitation to the victims of caste-based atrocities.16. On the other hand, where it appears to the Court thatthe offence in question, although covered under the SC/STAct, is primarily civil or private where the alleged offencehas not been committed on account of the caste of the victim,or where the continuation of the legal proceedings would bean abuse of the process of law, the Court can exercise its

Apowers to quash the proceedings. On similar lines, whenconsidering prayer for quashing on the basis of acompromise/settlement, if the Court is satisfied that theunderlying objective of the SC/ST Act would not becontravened or diminished even if the felony in question goesunpunished, the mere fact that the offence is covered under aB‘special statute’ would not refrain this Court or the High Court,from exercising their respective powers under Article 142 of”the Constitution or Section 482 Cr.P.C.

(emphasis supplied)

C35. We have bestowed anxious consideration to the precedentscited by learned counsel for the respondents and are of the view that thesame are inapposite to the factual scenario herein. Suffice it would be tostate that while the propositions laid down therein are not disputed, theydo not prejudice the version of the present appellant. Tapan KumarSingh(supra) and Naresh(supra) indicate that the FIR need not be aDdetailed one, as it is only to initiate the investigative process and thepolice should ordinarily be allowed to investigate. This is the generalrule, but not fetter on this Court or the High Court in an appropriatecase.

36. What is evincible from the extant case-law is that this CourtEhas been consistent in interfering in such matters where purely civildisputes, more often than not, relating to land and/or money are giventhe colour of criminality, only for the purposes of exerting extra-judicialpressure on the party concerned, which, we reiterate, is nothing butabuse of the process of the court. In the present case, there is huge,and quite frankly, unexplained delay of over 60 years in initiating disputeFwith regard to the ownership of the land in question, and the criminalcase has been lodged only after failure to obtain relief in the civil suits,coupled with denial of relief in the interim therein to the respondent no.2/her family members. It is evident that resort was now being had tocriminal proceedings which, in the considered opinion of this Court, isGwith ulterior motives, for oblique reasons and is clear case ofvengeance.

37. The Court would also note that even if the allegations aretaken to be true on their face value, it is not discernible that any offencecan be said to have been made out under the SC/ST Act against theHappellant. The complaint and FIR are frivolous, vexatious and oppressive.

38. This Court would indicate that the officers, who institute anAFIR, based on any complaint, are duty-bound to be vigilant before invokingany provision of very stringent statute, like the SC/ST Act, which imposesserious penal consequences on the concerned accused. The officer hasto be satisfied that the provisions he seeks to invoke prima facie applyto the case at hand. We clarify that our remarks, in no manner, are toBdilute the applicability of special/stringent statutes, but only to remind thepolice not to mechanically apply the law, dehors reference to the factualposition.

39. For the reasons aforesaid, the Court finds that the High Courtfell in error in not invoking its wholesome power under Section 482 ofthe Code to quash the FIR. Accordingly, the Impugned Judgment, beinguntenable in law, is set aside. Consequent thereupon, the FIR, as alsoany proceedings emanating therefrom, insofar as they relate to theappellant, are quashed and set aside.

40. Accordingly, this appeal stands allowed, without any ordertowards costs. Pending applications are consigned to records.

Divya Pandey(Assisted by : Mayank Batra, LCRA)

Appeal allowed.